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THE DUAL USE DILEMMA: CRYING OUT FOR LEADERSHIP 
DAVID R. FRANZ* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Between October 2011 and March 2012, a controversy regarding the 
publication of results of H5N1 influenza virus research by two scientists led 
to additional oversight of a relatively broad segment of the infectious 
disease research enterprise in the U.S.1 The episode has been described as 
an example of the “dual use dilemma,” legitimate and open research that 
could be exploited for harm by others. Why is leadership important in the 
context of the dual use dilemma? Is not dual use about technology and 
knowledge being misused for harm? Can we not just control the knowledge 
and technologies? How is the dual use dilemma related to the insider threat 
in research and clinical laboratories? What is our interest in these low 
likelihood events in twenty-first century America? The recent concern 
regarding Dual Use Research (DUR) is focused on the traditional agents of 
biological warfare and the influenza viruses. Yet, these Select Agents are but 
a small part of the spectrum of biological threats and risks we humans, our 
animals, and plants face today. Therefore, Dual Use Research of Concern 
(DURC) cannot be understood in isolation. What follows is a short history of 
the misuse –– and use –– of biology in what will always be a dangerous 
world. We cannot reduce risk to zero, but we can increase safety, security, 
and productivity in our laboratories without layering another set of 
 
* Dr. David Franz, former Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of 
Infectious Disease, retired as a Colonel from the U.S. Army in 1998. He served as a technical 
expert and chief inspector during the termination of the Soviet and Iraqi biological weapons 
programs in the early 1990s. Dr. Franz was a member of the National Academy of Sciences 
“Fink” Committee on dual use technologies and is a founding member of the National 
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. His current focus is responsible life sciences research 
and the role of international engagement as a component of global biosecurity policy. Dr. 
Franz holds a D.V.M. from Kansas State University and a Ph.D. in Physiology from Baylor 
College of Medicine. 
 1. Ron A.M. Fouchier et al., Transmission Studies Resume for Avian Flu, 339 SCI. 520, 
520 (2013). H5N1 is a subtype of the influenza A virus, known as “bird flu” or “highly-
pathogenic avian influenza.” It is sometimes designated “A/H5N1” or “A(H5N1).” It can 
cause illness in humans and many animal species. 
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regulations over the enterprise each time an individual scientist does 
something thoughtless or even malevolent. 
II.  DURC BACKGROUND 
A. A Short History of Laboratory Biosafety –– 1940s Onward 
The U.S. conducted offensive biological warfare research, development, 
and field-testing from mid-1942 until late 1969, when President Nixon 
traveled to Fort Detrick, Maryland, to announce that the U.S. would end its 
biological weapons program.2 In two National Security memoranda, the first 
dated November 25, 1969, and the second February 20, 1970, the U.S. 
Government renounced development, production, and stockpiling of 
biological weapons.3 Further, the U.S. declared its intent to maintain only 
quantities of agents necessary for the development of vaccines, drugs, and 
diagnostics.4 While I am convinced the weapons testing during the more 
than 25 years of the offensive program demonstrated nuclear equivalence 
of biological weapons, the real legacy of this program is the development 
and implementation of the foundational principles of modern laboratory 
biological safety. 
During the 1960s, Dr. Arnold G. Wedum, M.D., Ph.D,5 Director of 
Industrial Health and Safety at Fort Detrick, was the principal proponent and 
leader of a system of containment facilities, equipment, and procedures 
developed to greatly enhance the safety of the employees of the offensive 
program and the rural community in which the core laboratories were 
operated. Many of Dr. Wedum’s principles of biological safety served as the 
basis for the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) 
publication called Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories 
(BMBL).6 The BMBL is now updated regularly and has become the biosafety 
bible in laboratories around the globe. Thus, in what we might today call a 
reverse dual use model, some very important good has ultimately come 
from a program that was designed to do harm. 
 
 2. David R. Franz et al., The U.S. Biological Warfare and Biological Defense Programs, 
in TEXTBOOK OF MILITARY MEDICINE: MEDICAL ASPECTS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 
425, 431 (Russ Zatjchuk ed., 1997). 
 3. U.S. Nat’l Sec. Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 44 (Feb. 20, 
1970) (on file with the National Security Archive); U.S. Nat’l Sec. Council, National Security 
Decision Memorandum 35 (Nov. 25, 1969) (on file with the National Security Archive). 
 4. National Security Decision Memorandum 35, supra note 3. 
 5. Franz et al., supra note 2, at 430. 
 6. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS PUB. NO. 21-1112, BIOSAFETY IN 
MICROBIOLOGICAL AND BIOMEDICAL LABORATORIES 3 (5th ed. 2009). 
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By the end of the twentieth century, the principles of biosafety ––
 facilities, equipment, and procedures –– were codified, enhanced, 
respected, and followed by the scientists in the relatively few high-
containment labs in the U.S. The original U.S. high-containment labs were 
commissioned from 1971 to 1972 at Fort Detrick within the U.S. Army 
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID),7 and in 
Atlanta at the CDC just a few years later.8 
I served as Deputy Commander (1993–1995) and Commander (1995–
1998) of USAMRIID. My command briefings during the mid-90s often listed 
three top priorities –– “biosafety, biosafety, and biosafety.” We had good 
people in harm’s way during peacetime and in war in Biosafety Level-4 
(BSL-4)9 labs where one needle stick, one bone fragment through a surgical 
glove, or even the bite of an infected laboratory animal could mean almost 
certain death to a scientist or technician. While the institute was located on 
a fenced and guarded military installation with twenty-four hour unarmed 
guards, as well as redundant locking systems with personal identification 
number codes for laboratory suite entry, my focus was on the safety of the 
employees and the community, as well as the productivity of our laboratory. 
I learned in those six years that the same leadership approach that makes 
people safe, makes an organization productive, and gives a community a 
sense of well being, is based on nurturing a culture of responsibility and 
trust. 
B. Laboratory Biosecurity –– Mid-90s and Beyond 
In 1995, Mr. Larry Wayne Harris mailed a letter requesting an isolate of 
Yersinia pestis (Y. pestis), the plague bacillus, from the American Type 
Culture Collection (ATCC) in Manassas, Virginia.10 It was eventually 
 
 7. U.S. ARMY MED. RESEARCH INST. OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES, FACT SHEET (2012), available 
at http://www.usamriid.army.mil/aboutpage.cfm. 
 8. Personal communication with Dr. Thomas Ksiazak, University of Texas, Galveston 
National Labs (July 2013). 
 9. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 6, at 4. Biosafety Levels (1 – 4) are 
used to describe combinations of facilities, equipment, and procedures that allow safe 
handling of pathogens within a laboratory. The highest level (BSL-4) is used for the most 
dangerous pathogens. In it, the air moving in and out is filtered to contain the viruses being 
studies; scientists are protected by ‘space suits’ or special sealed hood lines. To the lay public, 
I often describe BSL-1 as a high school science room, BSL-2 as a hospital clinical lab, BSL-3 
as a containment lab for microbes for which we have vaccines or other effective medical 
countermeasures, and BSL-4 as a similar lab but in which physical systems (space suits and 
hood lines) are used to protect the people from bugs for which there are no or less effective 
countermeasures. 
 10. TOXIC TERROR: ASSESSING TERRORIST USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
(Jonathan B. Tucker ed., 2000). 
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discovered that the letterhead he used –– “Small Animal Microbiology 
Laboratory, 266 Cleveland Avenue, Lancaster, Ohio” and the “Ohio 
Environmental Protection Agency approval number 890” –– were 
fraudulent.11 While the ATCC ultimately shipped the vials of Y. pestis, Mr. 
Harris became impatient and called to follow up on his order. In doing so, 
he alerted authorities and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) became 
involved. While other incidents –– Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack in Tokyo on 
March 20, 199512 and the B’nai B’rith incident in Washington D.C. 
involving a petri dish of B. cereus in 199713 –– contributed to our increased 
concern about both the illicit acquisition and malevolent use of biological 
agents, it was the Harris incident that most greatly influenced our thinking 
regarding laboratory biological security in the U.S. 
The Select Agent Rule became law and was implemented in 1997.14 
This new rule made the transfer between laboratories illegal for designated 
bacteria, viruses, or toxins without CDC approval.15 Initially, the rule only 
affected agent transfers,16 which meant that many academic and clinical 
labs with select agent pathogens could maintain them without breaking the 
law. Only after an inspection by the CDC (or, for some pathogens, the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture) could a laboratory be certified to transfer 
pathogens on the list, and then once certified, transfer only to a similarly 
certified laboratory. The era of laboratory biosecurity had begun. As a result 
of his actions, Harris, the individual most directly responsible for the Select 
Agent Rule, was required to complete 200 hours of community service. 
Legitimate research with the listed agents would forever be more costly and 
probably less productive in government, academic, and industrial labs 
where the new rules were promulgated. 
C. DURC –– 2003 and Beyond 
The World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), and 
the first case of inhalational anthrax concerning the anthrax letters 
discovered on October 4, 2001 (10/4), changed everything. The U.S. 
biosecurity budget went from $137 million in 1997, to $14.5 billion spent 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REP. ON TERRORISM, at 209. 
 13. Matthew L. Wald, Suspicious Package Prompts 8-Hour Vigil at B’nai B’rith, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 5, 1997, at A12. 
 14. 42 C.F.R. § 73.16 (2012). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
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on biodefense from 2001 to 2004.17 Soon many more laboratories sought 
and received Select Agent certification.18 
Today, it is almost impossible to put one’s mind back into the state of 
infectious disease research before 2002, when thousands of new scientists 
began working with this short list of threat agents. After 9/11, 10/4, and the 
increased funding for new high-containment labs and Select Agent research, 
the next layer of DURC regulation in the life sciences was beginning to 
unfold. It would take another legitimate, even respected scientist,19 this time 
not trying to do harm, but possibly for personal or professional gain, to 
drive the U.S. Government to further regulate the traditional select agents 
and influenza viruses. 
About ten years before the 2012 controversy regarding the publication 
of information on the intentional development of a recombinant H5N1 
influenza virus transmissible between mammals, there was the reasonable 
observation by the U.S. biological sciences community that it should “think 
about policing itself” before the government intervened with undue 
regulation. The now well-known Fink Report by the National Academies of 
Science, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: The Dual-Use 
Dilemma, was a direct result.20 At that time, factors that triggered the 
perceived need for the study and subsequent report included: (1) a surprise 
result of Australian attempts to design a rodent sterilization virus,21 (2) the 
second de novo synthesis of poliovirus from a “web recipe,”22 and (3) a new 
understanding of the implications of the Smallpox Inhibitor of Complement 
Enzymes “SPICE gene” in orthopox viruses.23 
 
 17. Ari Schuler, Billions for Biodefense: Federal Agency Biodefense Funding: FY2001-
FY2005, 2 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 86, 86 (2004). 
 18. See James W. Blaine, Establishing a National Biological Laboratory Safety and 
Security Monitoring Program, 10 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & 
SCI. 396, 397 (2012) (explaining that from 2002-2012, 400 laboratories were registered in 
U.S.). 
 19. See, e.g., Sander Herfst et al., Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus 
Between Ferrets, 336 SCI. 1534, 1538 (2012). 
 20. See COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH STANDARDS & PRACTICES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE 
APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN 
AGE OF TERRORISM vii (2004) [hereinafter FINK REPORT]. 
 21. See Ronald J. Jackson et al., Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant 
Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic 
Resistance to Mousepox, 75 J. VIROLOGY 1205, 1206 (2001). 
 22. See Eckard Wimmer, The Test-Tube Synthesis of a Chemical Called Poliovirus: The 
Simple Synthesis of a Virus Has Far-Reaching Societal Implications, 7 EUROPEAN MOLECULAR 
BIOLOGY ORG. REP. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S3, S8 (2006). 
 23. See Ariella M. Rosengard et al., Variola Virus Immune Evasion Design: Expression of 
a Highly Efficient Inhibitor of Human Complement, 99 PROCEEDING OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 
OF THE U.S. 8809, 8813 (2002). 
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The nation was now working in a backdrop of 9/11 and 10/4,24 so 
misuse of biology was on our minds. Although the term “dual use” had 
been used in other settings, it was the Fink Report that really codified the 
term in this context.25 The Fink Report also suggested that a national-level 
committee be formed and composed of equal numbers of biology and 
security experts to help the government cope with the dual use dilemma.26 
The eventual response from the U.S. Government was the formation of the 
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) in 2004.27 Initially, 
the NSABB described DUR as “research yielding new technologies or 
information with the potential for both benevolent and malevolent 
applications . . . .”28 Later, after realizing that a significant percentage of the 
technology and knowledge in the life sciences enterprise could be used for 
good or harm, the NSABB chose the term DURC to define a subset of dual 
use knowledge and technologies. The NSABB described DURC as “research 
that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to 
provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly 
misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health and safety, 
agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment or materiel.”29 
III.  DURC DISCUSSION 
A. DURC Has Always Existed –– Just By Other Names 
DURC is nothing new; it is not a product of the twenty-first century. It has 
been around for tens or hundreds, maybe even thousands of years. 
Remember fire? What about nuclear fission? I have a personal example. 
During the mid to late-90s, a perfectly legitimate test of a potential antibody 
therapy against a virus in a high-containment laboratory at USAMRIID 
resulted in the natural development of resistance to the candidate therapy 
 
 24. See Gina Kolata, Florida Man Is Hospitalized With Pulmonary Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 5, 2001, at A16 (discussing Oct. 4, 2001, the day Mr. Stevens, a Florida man, was 
diagnosed with inhalational anthrax). 
 25. See FINK REPORT, supra note 20, at vii-viii. 
 26. Dana A. Shea, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33342 OVERSIGHT OF DUAL-USE BIOLOGICAL 
RESEARCH: THE NATIONAL SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY 2, 4 (2007), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33342.pdf. 
 27. NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. ON BIOSECURITY, ENHANCING RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND DISSEMINATION OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR DUAL 
USE RESEARCH, 1, 30 (2012), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/biosecurity/documents/ 
COMBINED_Codes_PDFs.pdf. 
 28. NSABB Frequently Asked Questions, What is “Dual Use Research” and “Dual Use 
Research of Concern”?, OFFICE OF SCI. POLICY-NIH, http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/nsabb 
_faq.html (last visited Aug.17, 2013). 
 29. Id. 
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being studied.30 The scientist, in whose laboratory it occurred, came to my 
office and explained the finding. We simply pulled a small group of experts 
together, examined the data, talked about the potential consequences, and 
decided to put the entire experiment into the autoclave. That was it. We did 
not hear anyone say, “Wow! We could get a paper in Science or Nature.” 
The scientists involved had a personal sense of responsibility and I, 
accepting the corporate responsibility, did not think twice about announcing 
it at a scientific meeting or hyping it to the media. It was not called DURC, 
but just another surprise from biology. These unexpected outcomes are part 
of what makes our professional experience so rewarding. I have often said, 
“It is why we call it biology after all.” There are many more benign surprises 
in biology than potentially malignant ones. Many scientists have spent the 
greater part of their lives trying to do good things with biology, and it is 
hard. My experience talking with former biological weapons scientists 
suggests that doing really bad things with biology is not that easy either. 
In the past, when surprises occurred in biology or any of the sciences, 
responsible scientists typically acted responsibly, neither trying to gain undue 
attention for themselves nor seeking to misuse the new information. There 
have been, and will always be, irresponsible or even criminal minds in all 
professions and societies, but the vast majority of humans involved in the life 
sciences will continue to contribute positively for the good of mankind. 
B. What Has Changed in the U.S. and the World? 
Dartmouth Professor Kendall Hoyt, Ph.D., in her book, Long Shot, asked 
the questions: “Why was the U.S. Government so successful in developing 
and fielding vaccines from the 1940s through the 1950s, and why has it 
been so difficult in recent years?”31 It cannot be the technologies, which 
have been greatly improved during the period in which progress in fielding 
has slowed. One would expect us to be better and faster today than 50 
years ago. It turns out there may be several factors that explain the earlier 
successes and difficulties today. For example, simpler technologies and less 
complex approval protocols. However, Dr. Hoyt made two other important 
conclusions, which suggest more behavioral than technical explanations. 
First, she learned that “champion-led research,” in which a single, 
dedicated individual shepherds a vaccine candidate from the bench all the 
way through development, clinical trials, and licensure, was much more 
common.32 Second, Dr. Hoyt learned that those champions were working 
 
 30. This passage is my personal recollection. It occurred between 1995 and 1998. 
 31. See KENDALL HOYT, LONG SHOT VACCINES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE 2, 4 (Harvard Univ. 
Press 2012). 
 32. Id. at 5. 
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within “collaborative communities.”33 In these communities, scientists 
worked in teams and openly shared helpful information within and between 
those teams, even if this information might help make competitors 
successful. 
A likely major contributor to both the motivation of the champions and 
the formation of communities was the patriotism and sense of urgency of a 
nation at war during World War II (WWII). Many of the scientists who had 
served their country in military laboratories, such as the Walter Reed Army 
Institute of Research, then moved to commercial enterprise. The motivation 
and cultural norm in the workplace that was learned under excellent 
leadership in a time of great national struggle likely contributed to the burst 
of commercial productivity after the war. It is my belief that leadership and 
communities of trust not only lead to more productivity, but also reduce the 
potential impact of DURC and even the threat of insider misconduct or 
criminality. 
Possibly the most troubling development in some of our government 
laboratories in the last ten to fifteen years has been the separation of 
responsibility and authority. Individuals in the laboratory are powerfully 
motivated and have increased productivity levels when authority and 
responsibility are balanced. We are losing this balance and the kind of 
supercharging that results. Beginning in the Department of Defense (DOD) 
before 9/11 and spreading to other government security laboratories, this 
authority to make decisions locally has been pulled to within the beltway, 
while responsibility has stayed with the laboratories. Relatively inexperienced 
managers are now often assigned to manage research project portfolios 
within the laboratories from afar. In the past, laboratory directors or 
commanders were selected from a vibrant pool of scientists all considered to 
be technical, subject-matter experts and tested or potential leaders. They 
knew their programs, were dedicated to their missions and loved their 
people. Today, good people hold some of those positions with leadership 
experience from other military sectors, but lack technical credibility. In other 
cases, qualified leaders are given responsibility, but adequate authority to 
do their jobs is withheld. 
C. We are No Longer Alone 
The biological playing field, both with regard to disease and progress 
toward controlling disease, is enormous, complex, extremely dynamic, 
competitive, and global. Like the rest of the sciences, technical advances in 
biology are incremental, but cumulative, and generally not reversible.34 One 
 
 33. Id. at 6. 
 34. The general concept drawn from discussions with Roger Brent (Feb 2013). 
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cannot put the toothpaste of the global life sciences enterprise back in the 
tube. Like physical and chemical phenomena in nature, biological ones 
challenge us as a human race and exact a toll on health and life. More than 
nine million of the fifty million plus people who die globally each year die of 
infectious diseases.35 Plant losses from pests and pathogens alone are 
believed to result in monetary losses of approximately $20 to 33 billion 
annually in the U.S., so the challenges of disease are not only related 
directly to humans.36 
1. Natural and Intentional Disease 
Our experience with intentional disease –– biological warfare, terrorism, 
and crime –– is much more limited than our experience with naturally 
occurring disease. Historians believe at least 10,000 to 12,000 Chinese 
died from biological warfare attacks by the Japanese during WWII.37 We 
know that five humans died as a result of the anthrax letters sent through the 
U.S. mail system in 2001.38 Biological agents have also been used to kill 
humans in what most would consider biocrimes. The majority of those 
crimes involved contamination of food with biological toxins or replicating 
agents.39 The relative emphasis the government placed on these health risks 
varied with the perception of them; the perception held by politicians and 
the news media are particularly powerful. 
  
 
 35. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1996: FIGHTING DISEASE FOSTERING 
DEVELOPMENT 1 (1996). 
 36. CALVIN O. QUALSET & HENRY L. SHANDS, SAFEGUARDING THE FUTURE OF U.S. 
AGRICULTURE: THE NEED TO CONSERVE THREATENED COLLECTIONS OF CROP DIVERSITY WORLDWIDE 
7 (2005). 
 37. Judith Miller, When Germ Warfare Happened, 20 CITY JOURNAL 86, 86 (Spring 
2010). 
 38. JEANNE GUILLEMIN, AMERICAN ANTHRAX: FEAR, CRIME, AND THE INVESTIGATION OF THE 
NATION’S DEADLIEST BIOTERROR ATTACK, xx-xxi (Henry Holt & Co. 2011). 
 39. W. SETH CARUS, BIOTERRORISM AND BIOCRIMES: THE ILLICIT USE OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS 
SINCE 1900, 19-20 (Minerva Grp. 2002) (1998). 
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The above figure represents the relative impact in lives lost from 
unintentional disease and the intentional misuse of biology. Regardless of 
how you define the anthrax letter attacks, whether as misuse or terrorism, 
there were five deaths as a result of that intentional event. DURC examples 
can be found across most of this space, as can insider threat potential. The 
risk-threat spectrum, as shown above, is ever changing, making the analysis 
of requirements for preparedness, response, recovery, and policy very 
difficult. Understanding what to do about intentional health threats is even 
more difficult than planning for natural risks and threats. 
2. Health and Security 
Both health and security are of interest to government decision makers 
and decision influencers. The funding they provide to protect the population 
depends on their perception of the threat or risk. It also appears that in 
biology, government decision makers often prefer funding response 
measures rather than preventive measures, regardless of whether they are 
seeking health or security. When HIV and AIDS were discovered, Congress 
called for huge increases in funding for health. When 9/11 and 10/4 
occurred, massive increases in funding occurred, this time for security. The 
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease’s (NIAID) annual budget 
for biosecurity was increased from essentially zero dollars to $1.7 billion 
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after the anthrax letters in 2001.40 But when no further attacks occurred in 
the next five to ten years, the program’s emphasis changed from traditional 
threat agents toward emerging infectious diseases.41 
3. The Advance of Technologies 
Biotechnology, and the knowledge that derives from it, has been 
increasing at a phenomenal rate for the past 20 years.42 Rob Carlson, a 
biotechnology futurist, has calculated that genetically modified systems 
generated more than $300 billion, or two percent Gross Domestic Product 
for the U.S economy in 2010.43 Just as new biological knowledge builds on 
previous knowledge, so too, the biotech revolution was built on previous 
revolutions in transportation and communication. In 1999, Harvard 
Professor Matthew Messelsen, Ph.D., a major influence on President Nixon 
who renounced biological weapons, said, “Every major technology –– 
metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, electronics, nuclear 
energy –– has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but 
also for hostile ones. Must this also happen with biotechnology, certain to 
be a dominant technology of the [twenty-first] century?”44 His concerns were 
as much prophetic as they were a warning. Dr. Messelsen made the 
statement in the very early days of molecular biology; our capabilities and 
knowledge have now caught up with his concerns. This is particularly true in 
the twenty-first century, but there has not been a massive loss of life as a 
result of intentional misuse of these powerful tools. 
D. Biological Warfare, Terrorism, and Crimes 
While relatively few humans or animals have died of intentional misuse 
of biology in modern times, several governments, non-government groups, 
 
 40. See Anthony S. Fauci et al., Emerging Infectious Diseases: A 10-Year Perspective from 
the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 17 INT’L J. RISK & SAFETY 157, 159, 
164 (2005). 
 41. See David R. Franz, Preparedness for an Anthrax Attack, 30 MOLECULAR ASPECT MED. 
503, 504. This was not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, it might have been wiser to fund both 
the traditional threat agent countermeasures and those for the emerging diseases from the 
outset. See id. at 504-07. 
 42. See ROBERT H. CARLSON, BIOLOGY IS TECHNOLOGY: THE PROMISE, PERIL, AND NEW 
BUSINESS OF ENGINEERING LIFE, 233 (Harvard Univ. Press 2010). 
 43. Robert H. Carlson, Biodesic 2011 Bioeconomy Update: U.S. Revenues from 
Genetically Modified Systems Now $300 Billion, or Greater than 2% of GDP, SYNTHESIS (Aug. 
15, 2011, 11:18 AM), http://www.synthesis.cc/2011/08/biodesic-2011-bioeconomy-update-
us-revenues-from-genetically-modified-systems-now-300-billion-or-gre.html. 
 44. Matthew Meselson, Professor, Harvard Univ., Presentation on The Problem of 
Biological Weapons at the 1818th Stated Meeting of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences (Jan. 13, 1999), available at http://www.pugwash.org/reports/cbw/cbw5.htm. 
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and even individuals have developed biological weapons or conducted 
research toward that end. 
1. Enormous State-Sponsored Biological Warfare Programs But Little 
Actual Use 
Evidence shows that during WWII the Japanese conducted wide-ranging 
human experiments with biological agents and also conducted focal attacks 
on a number of Chinese villages. These activities are chronicled in a book 
that takes the name of the Japanese military unit involved, Unit 731.45 The 
records of this secret unit, then headquartered near Harbin, China, were 
handed over to American forces in exchange for leniency toward the 
perpetrators.46 While the U.S. may have hoped to apply lessons learned 
from the unit’s reports to bolster its own biological warfare program, the 
consensus is that Japan’s research was of little value, as it was far from 
scientific.47 In many cases, the number of test subjects per study group was 
one or just a few, making the data analysis impossible.48 Describing what 
appeared to be more of a random torture campaign against Chinese and 
allied prisoners than a research program, the records were soon filed in the 
U.S. archives where they remain today.49 The Japanese attacks themselves, 
the most famous of which involved clay pots filled with rice and Y. pestis 
infected fleas dropped on Chinese villages from the air, were described in 
2005, by a young officer of the Peoples Liberation Army.50 Until very 
recently, the Chinese sought reparations from the Japanese for these 
attacks. The Japanese government has apparently now acknowledged that 
they did occur.51 Many find it surprising to learn that these poorly 
understood attacks on Chinese villages over 70 years ago are the largest 
biological attacks undertaken by a state in the modern era. 
In April 1942, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson recommended the 
creation of a U.S. civilian advisory group to coordinate government and 
non-governmental organizations in a biological warfare effort to President 
 
 45. See PETER WILLIAMS & DAVID WALLACE, UNIT 731: JAPAN’S SECRET BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 
IN WORLD WAR II (Free Press, 1st ed. 1989). 
 46. See id. at 202-219, 235. 
 47. See id. at 257-266. 
 48. Personal communication with William C. Patrick, III, expert in germ and biological 
warfare (late 1990s). 
 49. See U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., SELECT DOCUMENTS ON JAPANESE WAR 
CRIMES AND JAPANESE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 3, 1934-2006, available at http://archives.gov/ 
iwg/japanese-war-crimes/select-documents.pdf. 
 50. Id. at 5. See also LI XIAOFANG, BLOOD-WEEPING ACCUSATIONS: RECORDS OF ANTHRAX 
VICTIMS (2005). 
 51. Personal Communication with Wang Xuan, a Chinese activist, in Beijing (Sept. 2012). 
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Franklin Roosevelt.52 The War Reserve Service, headed by George W. 
Merck, was established under the Federal Security Agency, part of the 
Department of Agriculture at the time. Secret work, under Mr. Merck’s 
direction in 1942, involved 28 U.S. universities including, Harvard and 
Stanford, with a budget of $200,000.53 What President Roosevelt did not 
know was that the U.S. Army Chemical Corps had already begun exploring 
biological weapons in 1941.54 Eventually, it was the Army that became the 
larger part of the nation’s offensive program with millions of dollars in 
funding and several geographic sites at locations including, a research 
facility at Camp Detrick in Frederick, Maryland, a manufacturing plant at 
Terre Haute, Indiana, and a 2,000-acre field test site at Horn Island, 
Mississippi.55 The U.S. build-up was in response to concerns over a 
biological weapons program in Germany in WWII, yet it was the Japanese 
that should have been the main concern. 
By 1943, the programs at Camp Detrick employed “3,800 military and 
100 civilian personnel.”56 During WWII, the U.S. exchanged technical 
information with Canada and Great Britain, both of which had their own 
offensive programs. In 1944, Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, replaced the 
Mississippi test site (the Utah site is used today to test environmental sensors, 
decontamination techniques and equipment as countermeasures to 
biological weapons).57 “In January 1946, the [U.S. Government] made 
public for the first time the fact that [it] had been conducting biological 
warfare research, [development], and testing.”58 In 1953, an agreement 
was signed between the Army Chemical Corps and the U.S. Army Medical 
Department to collaborate on the development of medical countermeasures 
for the military force in parallel with the offensive program.59 By the mid-
1950s, the large weapons complex at Camp Detrick included a pilot plant 
and a special operations division.60 Until the offensive program ended in 
1969, the medical department continued its work, and the Chemical Corps 
worked on developing biological weapons and conducting large-scale field 
tests in the continental U.S., Alaska, and the Pacific.61 
In retrospect, we knew that the offensive program demonstrated that 
biological warfare was truly feasible, and a more recent analysis of original 
 
 52. Franz et al., supra note 2, at 426. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 427. 
 57. Franz et al., supra note 2, at 427. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 428. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 431. 
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documents supports the argument that the biological program achieved 
nuclear equivalence in killing power.62 “In response to President Nixon’s 
decision in 1969, all [agent] stocks were destroyed within a year, between 
May 1971 to May 1972.”63 The Terre Haute plant was sold to the Pfizer 
Company, the Pine Bluff, Arkansas facility was converted to the National 
Center for Toxicological Research,64 and most of Fort Detrick’s facilities 
were eventually turned over to the National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) 
National Cancer Institute. In 1967, the Army broke ground at Fort Detrick 
for a new medical defense research facility, which would become 
USAMRIID.65 USAMRIID’s new mission was to “conduct studies related to 
medical defensive aspects of biological agents of military importance and 
develop appropriate biological protective measures, diagnostic procedures, 
and therapeutic methods.”66 After 9/11, USAMRIID would come to national 
prominence. First, for its exceptional and unique role in analyzing samples 
in support of response and recovery from the anthrax letters attacks, and 
second, as the home laboratory of Bruce Ivins, Ph.D., the person of interest 
who took his own life as the FBI was about to charge him as the mailer of 
those letters.67 
The former Soviet Union also had an offensive biological weapons (BW) 
program that was the largest and most comprehensive in history, and almost 
certainly the largest the world will ever know. Its size and level of funding 
greatly increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s, just after the Soviet 
Union, like the U.S., signed and ratified the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC) in 1972 and 1975, respectively.68 While intelligence communities in 
 
 62. Personal communication with William C. Patrick, III, expert in germ and biological 
warfare (Fall 2010) and Dr. Robert P. Kadlec (Sep. 2013). 
 63. Id. 
 64. About Food and Drug Administration, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda. 
gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/OfficeofScientificandMedicalPrograms/NCTR/WhatWeDo 
/FacilitiesServices/ucm121463.htm (last updated Sept. 9, 2012) (explaining the location of 
the Arkansas facility). 
 65. Franz et al., supra note 2, at 431. The current USAMRIID facility broke ground in 
1967 and opened in phases in 1971 and 1972. It is currently scheduled to be replaced by a 
new facility on the same campus at Fort Detrick, MD and the move to the new facility is 
scheduled to begin in 2014. Id. See also U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT: REAL PROPERTY MASTER PLAN FOR ARMY-CONTROLLED LAND AT AREAS A AND C OF 
FORT DETRICK IN FREDERICK COUNTY, MARYLAND 30 (2010), http://www.detrick.army.mil/emo/ 
ea/AreasACMP EA.pdf. 
 66. Franz et al., supra note 2, at 431. 
 67. Guillemin, supra note 39, at 2-3, 106. 
 68. Biological Weapons Convention Signatories and States-Parties, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwcsig (last updated April 2013). See also Raymond 
A. Zilinskas, The Anti-Plague System and the Soviet Biological Warfare Program, 32 CRITICAL 
REVIEWS IN MICROBIOLOGY 47, 49 (2006). 
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the free world were aware of the program, the public knew little until 
February 13, 1980.69 Public awareness occurred globally when a German 
magazine, Bild-Zeitung, carried the story of an accident at a military facility 
in Sverdlovsk, Russia.70 The story was confirmed, and it soon became clear, 
that there had been at least 64 deaths from anthrax71 and a massive cover-
up by Soviet military and political authorities. It was at this point that Dr. 
Messelson led a team to Sverdlovsk to attempt to better understand what 
had happened.72 
We would later learn from defectors, Vladimir Pasechnik, who sought 
asylum in the United Kingdom (U.K.) in 1989, and Ken Alibek in the U.S. in 
1992,73 that the Soviet enterprise was massive, far larger, and more 
advanced than that of the U.S. A strategic turning point in the Western 
search for evidence of a Soviet program came with the discovery of an 
enormous B. anthracis spore production capability in Stepnagorsk, 
Kazakhstan.74 It was Alibek, through a popular book, Biohazard, who first 
described the Soviet program in great detail.75 We learned of several 
military biological warfare facilities and a network of at least 18 generally 
non-military research institutes and plants called Biopreparat.76 Biopreparat 
was created in 1973, just after the Soviet Union signed the BWC.77 Alibek, 
Biopreparat’s Deputy Director in 1992, estimated there were 30,000 
scientists, engineers, and technicians in the whole program.78 
 
 69. TOM MANGOLD & JEFF GOLDBERG, PLAGUE WARS: THE TERRIFYING REALITY OF 
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 73, 406 (2001). 
 70. JUDITH MILLER ET AL., GERMS: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND AMERICA’S SECRET WAR 76 
(2001). 
 71. MANGOLD & GOLDBERG, supra note 70, at 70. 
 72. See Matthew Meselson et al., The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979, 266 SCI. 
1202 (1994). 
 73. See Linda Kozaryn, Former Soveits’ Bio-War Expert Details Threat, U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEFENSE (Nov. 3, 1999), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=42946 (the 
U.S. production capacity was on the order of one ton of a given agent per year, while the 
Soviet capacity was 100 to 1,000 tons per year). See also Vladimir Pasechnik, TEL., Nov. 29, 
2011, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1363752/Vladimir-Pasech 
nik.html. 
 74. See DAVID E. HOFFMAN, THE DEAD HAND: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE COLD WAR ARMS 
RACE AND ITS DANGEROUS LEGACY 463-64 (2009) (describing the discovery of the Soviet 
anthrax plant at Stepnogorsk, Kazachstan, negotiations for entry, and ultimate destruction of 
the facility). 
 75. See KEN ALIBEK, BIOHAZARD: THE CHILLING TRUE STORY OF THE LARGEST COVERT 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM IN THE WORLD –– TOLD FROM INSIDE BY THE MAN WHO RAN IT 
(1999) (Random House NY). 
 76. See id. 
 77. Jonathan B. Tucker, Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with 
Dr. Kenneth Alibek. 4 THE NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 5 (1999). 
 78. Id. at 6. 
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After the 1991 collapse of the former Soviet Union, Ministry of Defense 
funding for biological warfare programs diminished to almost nothing. In 
April 1992, President Yeltsin publicly outlawed biological weapons in 
Russia.79 On October 5, 1993, the day after Yeltsin’s constitutional crisis 
and the attacks on the Russian White House, the first team of joint U.S./U.K. 
inspectors, in support of the Trilateral Agreement, began their visits to 
Biopreparat facilities.80 It was my first of what would be many trips to Russia 
over the next ten years. 
I see the following anecdote as unique and one of the most impactful 
experiences in my career with regard to the way I think about arms control 
and international engagement. 
It was January 1994, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) building in 
Moscow. I was involved as a technical expert in the ongoing Trilateral 
Agreement discussions and negotiations. The Russians faced us from across 
a large table while our U.S./U.K. delegation worked from the side with the 
sun in our eyes. Much of the discussion addressed ground rules for the visits: 
how many sites, what could be covered with a tarp or screen and called 
proprietary, how many members of each team would be allowed, could 
samples be taken, and what was the protocol for sampling? We got to a part 
of the bracketed text that was mostly technical. The head of our delegation 
turned to me and said, “Colonel Franz, you and Colonel Pickavich go into 
the next room and work on this part of the text — it is only science.” My 
partner was a uniformed M.D., Ph.D. from the Russian Army. We went to the 
next room, reconciled our texts, and returned to the delegation that was still 
debating the mechanics. Our brackets were gone and it had been easy 
because it was only science. At the next break, my new friend and I 
wandered toward each other and were soon talking about our scientific 
interests and even about our families. That experience, so brief yet so 
powerful, changed the way I thought about international engagement and 
biological security. I realized that science and public health provide a 
common language and that working toward trust can tear down superficial, 
but sometimes very resilient, political barriers. I had not heard of DURC at 
the time, and had only given minimal thought to the insider threat, but my 
experience at the MFA would impact my thinking on how to deal with the 
more subtle challenges we face today.81 
 
 79. THE GATHERING BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STORM 170 (Jim A. Davis & Barry R. Schneider 
eds., 2004). 
 80. See Serge Schmemann, Revolt in Moscow: How Yeltsin Turned the Tide, Hour by 
Hour, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1993, at A1, A6; MANGOLD & GOLDBERG, supra note 70, at 197. 
 81. Names were changed for confidentially. 
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When the Trilateral Agreement visits and negotiations eventually ground 
to a halt, collapsing under the weight of mistrust on both sides, U.S. 
Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar demonstrated visionary leadership 
by stepping into the gap with a most thoughtful, and at that time, politically 
risky idea: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program of 
1991.82 Actually, the establishment of this program predates the failure of 
the Trilateral Agreement. Did the Senators anticipate the Trilateral’s failure 
or just realize there was not a mandate to try to force the Russians to admit 
they had been conducting an illicit BW program for 20 years? Whatever 
their motivations, it was the right response at the right time in history. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following timeline summarizes major events of the five-year period 
during which both the Soviet Union and Iraqi BW programs were under 
great scrutiny by the West. The U.S. and U.K. were involved in the Trilateral 
Agreement visits and were key players in the United Nations Special 
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) visits. 
  
 
 82. See Nunn-Lugar Global Cooperation Initiative, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY & 
USSTRATCOM CENTER FOR COMBATING WMD & STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS-
ELIMINATION, available at http://www.dtra.mil/Missions/nunn-lugar/nunn-lugar-home.aspx 
(last visited Sep. 17, 2013). 
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The early 1990s was a time of winding down state-sponsored weapons 
programs. Interspersed between trips to Russia and London for the Trilateral 
Agreement related negotiations, I traveled to Baghdad where I served as 
Chief Inspector for three UNSCOM’s biological warfare missions. The 
purpose of these inspection missions was to implement United Nations 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687, an effort to assure the 
uncovering and removal of Saddam Hussein’s offensive biological warfare 
program.83 It turns out that the Iraqi program probably began in the early 
1980s when equipment was purchased from Germany, and pathogen 
strains from France and the U.S.84 Some of the strains were used for 
legitimate medical countermeasure development and others, notably B. 
anthracis and C. botulinum, for weapons development.85 The Iraqis worked 
with other bacterial and viral strains, but in the end, they weaponized just 
anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin.86 
The program was discovered during the First Gulf War, but production 
of agents had been ramped up before the war, probably beginning in 
1989.87 The main research center, Salman Pak, was destroyed during early 
bombing. The production site at Al Hakam, unknown to the West during the 
bombing raids, was later destroyed by the United Nations (U.N.). The other 
key facility, Al Manal Foot and Mouth Disease Center, was preserved 
because of its potential value to the country for legitimate agricultural use. 
Tim Trevan, an individual actively involved in many of the early inspections, 
wrote the first comprehensive popular account of the program and the 
activities of UNSCOM.88 In Mr. Trevan’s book, Saddam’s Hidden Secrets, 
published in 1999, he provides an on-the-ground, inspector’s eye-view of 
the very difficult task of definitively identifying small-scale offensive 
biological developments by a nation state.89 
E. Non-State Misuse of Biology 
While states planned and prepared for biological warfare, they almost 
never used the weapons they developed. We learned of non-state plans and 
programs only after the rather primitive weapons were used. Three major 
non-state crimes, none causing loss of life like that seen with chemical 
 
 83. See S.C. Res. 687, ¶¶ 8(a), 10, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/687 (April 3, 1991), 
available at http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm. 
 84. See TIM TREVAN, SADDAM’S SECRETS: THE HUNT FOR IRAQ’S HIDDEN WEAPONS 341, 343 
(1999). 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. (describing types of chemical weapons the Iraqi worked with). 
 87. See id. at 341 (describing the timeline of production of agents). 
 88. See id. at i, 1. 
 89. See TREVAN, supra note 84, at ix-x. 
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crimes, influenced our thinking about threats and risks near the end of the 
twentieth century. The first, in 1984, resulted in the food poisoning of more 
than 700 individuals in The Dalles, Oregon.90 The fact that it took the CDC 
a year to discover that it was not a natural foodborne outbreak is a 
significant measure of how we perceived risk from intentional misuse of 
biology just 30 years ago. While there had been previous criminal 
biological activity in the U.S. and other countries, particularly Japan, the 
Oregon attack was by far the largest with the contamination of at least ten 
restaurant salad bars with salmonella bacteria.91 
It turns out that the followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, an eccentric 
philosopher and modern-day interpreter of mysticism and religions, 
conducted the attack for political reasons.92 They hoped to incapacitate part 
of the largest voting block in the county to give themselves an advantage in 
an election for members of a county court.93 It appears that up to one dozen 
people were involved in either planning or executing the plot.94 The 
contamination of salad bars was a trial run, as they were also planning to 
contaminate the water supply, but apparently never did.95 The fact that so 
many people were involved and the perpetrators were not discovered for 
many months underscores the extremely poor awareness of biological 
crimes among our political leaders, health officials, citizens, and even the 
media. It is also interesting to note that after the adulteration of salad bars 
by the Rajneesh cult, the U.S. Government did not respond with new policies 
or legislation. 
Fearing copycat attacks, federal and state investigators requested that 
the Journal of the American Medical Association not publish a record of the 
incident, and the journal complied.96 Judith Miller, a former New York Times 
correspondent and Pulitzer Prize winning author, and her colleagues 
published the story of the above attacks years later in the book Germs.97 
This forgotten incident occurred long before the Fink Report, before NSABB 
discussions occurred regarding DURC, and before we seriously considered 
the implications of the publication of threat techniques or public 
vulnerabilities. By standards of today, there was little media attention given. 
 
 90. Joseph E. McDade & David Franz, Bioterrorism as a Public Health Threat, 4 
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 91. Id. See also CARUS, supra note 40. 
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The second incident before 9/11, which had a significant impact on our 
thinking and awareness of the risks of biological attacks, was a chemical 
attack. In 1995, ten years after the incident in Oregon, followers of Shoko 
Asahara, called the Aum Shinrikyo (Aum), an eccentric and powerful group, 
carried out a gas attack on Tokyo’s subway system.98 The attack used crude 
sarin gas that was delivered by a very simple, improvised device.99 This 
attack killed 13 commuters, seriously injured more than 50, and affected 
nearly 1,000.100 It followed an earlier sarin attack, in mid-1994, in which 
seven people died and two hundred became ill.101 
The cult’s religious organizational status, gained in 1989, may have 
offered some protection in Japanese society.102 The Aum’s broader activities 
demonstrated behavior even more bizarre than the Rajneehes had displayed 
ten years prior in the Oregon attacks. In addition to several kidnappings 
and assassinations conducted by members, the cult traveled to Australia to 
field-test their sarin on animals.103 They also traveled to Russia to acquire 
military equipment, reportedly even seeking components for a nuclear 
weapon.104 The illicit biological activity for which they are best known is the 
release of a bacillus species in July 1993, from the top of a Tokyo 
building.105 It was later learned that the anthrax was not virulent, and that 
the steam device used was not an effective means of dissemination. While 
the Aum’s signature attack was with a chemical, not a biological agent, it 
clearly had a wake up effect on U.S. policymakers, public health community 
leaders, and the media. 
The third incident in this series, while much less impactful than the two 
previously mentioned, had a galvanizing impact on U.S. law enforcement 
and legislative communities. No one died, no pathogens were used, but Mr. 
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Harris’106 request to the ATCC for an isolate of Y. pestis led to new 
legislation.107 This new legislation made the act of transferring certain 
pathogens between laboratories a crime, and made work more difficult for 
the scientists and laboratories who conducted research with these agents.108 
Harris was required to complete 200 hours of community service and 
laboratories were given the Select Agent Rule, the law prohibiting transfer of 
a defined group of biological agents between laboratories not certified for 
such actions by the U.S. Government. The rules would continue and 
become more onerous for years after the 200 hours of service served by Mr. 
Harris passed. 
Why the need for the Select Agent Rule, a regulatory response that 
seemed at the time too far-reaching for the crime, or actually, no-crime? 
Probably because we were primed. We had seen the enormity of the Soviet 
program in significant detail, now understood the Rajneesh salad bar attack 
and the terror impact of the Aum’s sarin attacks, had learned of the Iraqi 
offensive program, and were in the midst of planning for the Summer 
Olympics in Atlanta. Still on active duty and commanding USARMIID, I 
recall this as the time that our own thinking expanded and, in a sense, 
shifted from a focus on protecting our forces on a distant European 
battlefield to protecting our citizens at home. We made it through the 
Olympics Games in Atlanta mostly unscathed, at least biologically, but we 
continued to think about the domestic threat and to enhance our 
preparations. 
1. And then Everything Changed Forever 
We all know where we stood gazing at a television screen as the second 
plane slammed into the World Trade Center on that clear September 
morning. The next few minutes wrung some innocence out of the American 
culture that will likely never return. In the memories of those who have 
dedicated their lives to the security of the nation, there is a bright line 
through the events of 9/11.109 
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Just three weeks after 9/11, I was in New York City preparing for a 
taping of CBS’s 60 Minutes with Mike Osterholm, Matthew Messelson, and 
Richard Butler. As I sat in a makeup chair, Mike Wallace walked up behind 
me holding, as I recall, several linked, perforated pages that looked like 
they came from a telex machine. He said, “Dr. Franz, there’s a wire report 
of a case of inhalational anthrax in a Florida man. What do you think?” My 
response was too quick, “No way! We haven’t had a case of inhalational 
anthrax in this country since 1978!” I have often relived that moment and 
thought to myself, “Wow! If I wasn’t prepared for that at that very time in 
history, who was? For Pete’s sake, it was my job!” 
Later that evening, I left John F. Kennedy International Airport for 
Moscow. When I connected with my wife by email a few days later, she 
informed me that our friend, Judy Miller, had called to talk with me. Judy 
had received a letter containing some granular powder in her office at the 
New York Times. By the time I returned to the U.S., we were in the midst of a 
response to the biological event that would further change our lives and our 
life sciences enterprise forever. 
2. The Anthrax Letters 
The so-called anthrax letters changed much of the world I had come to 
know so well over the previous 14 years. Life at USAMRIID had been very 
different in the 1990s. We had come through some really hard times 
together. The Clinton peace-dividend right-sizing of the military force had 
resulted in salami-slicing cuts of personnel and funding. We had been 
forced to reduce our military and civilian workforce by 31% from 1991 
through 1997.110 We were able to cut many staff by attrition, as well as 
offering early retirement packages,111 but I was forced to fire the last 17 
people, many my personal friends, due to a reduction in force. That had 
been a nightmare for me, but also a lesson regarding the basic goodness of 
people. Some told me on the spot, almost apologetically, that they knew 
how hard it was for me. Others later wrote letters saying they had landed on 
their feet and not to worry. 
We were also constantly strapped for funds. Just one year before I was 
to finish my tour as commander of USAMRIID, our initial funding for fiscal 
year 1997 had been $18 million. It took about $16 million to run the very 
 
SCIENTISTS (January 17-31, 2002), http://www.911review.org/Wget/www.fas.org/bwc 
/news/anthraxreport.htm (commenting on the FBI’s knowledge of the anthrax killer). 
 110. This information comes from my personal recollection. 
 111. See, e.g., U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., GUIDE TO VOLUNTARY EARLY RETIREMENT 
REGULATIONS (2006); U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., GUIDE TO VOLUNTARY SEPARATION 
INCENTIVE PAYMENTS (2006) (stating the guidelines to follow when offering early retirement and 
separation incentive payments). 
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complex and unique high-containment infectious disease laboratories and 
to pay civilian salaries, leaving only $2 million for research. I wrote a formal 
request to my higher command asking to furlough one-half of the civilian 
workforce to free up funds for research. In response, we received another 
$1.5 to $2 million for research.112 Those lean times were good for us, and 
good for me as the commander, I had a great boss who gave me authority 
commensurate with my responsibility, and supported me. There was a sense 
that we, the military and civilian employees, were in this together; we were a 
team, a family. We not only survived, but also prospered. The patriotic, 
hard-working employees made enormous strides in diagnostics for 
biological warfare agents, education of healthcare providers, and amazing 
advances in basic and preclinical research supporting the development of 
vaccines for the force. 
I walked out of the USAMRIID late one Sunday night in the summer of 
1998, with the last box of books from my office in my arms and tears 
dripping from my chin. I loved the USAMRIID, the mission, and the people. I 
still have a homemade bumper sticker that I placed on my command suite 
bulletin board during the most difficult times: “Someday, we’ll look back 
and say it was fun.” And I have many, many times. As my wife and I formally 
said goodbye in the Dalrymple Conference Room, I told my friends, “It is not 
the science, but you people I will remember.” I was right. 
When the anthrax letters arrived at the various media and government 
offices, the frenzy began. At this point, I still knew the leadership and most of 
the staff at USAMRIID very well. In addition to receiving some of the actual 
letters for analysis, suddenly my friends were inundated with samples of 
unknown white powders from all over the country. They worked in round-
the-clock shifts to handle the increased workload and processed more 
anthrax samples than any other laboratory in the nation. As a result of the 
tragic death of five innocent Americans from the anthrax letters, there was 
an immediate response in Washington with the administration of antibiotics 
and vaccines for exposed victims, an enormously expensive cleanup at the 
Senate and Post Office buildings, and the development of forensics tools in 
contractor labs. Lastly, time and resources were expended for the nearly 
seven-year FBI investigation with the “person of interest” lawsuit.113 This long 
ordeal ended with the death of Dr. Ivins. As I have stated on the back cover 
of the book, “American Anthrax is a gripping story of a series of human 
tragedies at the collision of behavior, biology, and bureaucracy. It 
 
 112. The above information comes from my personal recollections. 
 113. See, e.g., GUILLEMIN, supra note 39; LEONARD A. COLE, THE ANTHRAX LETTERS: A 
MEDICAL DETECTIVE STORY (Joseph Henry Press 2003); DAVID WILLMAN, THE MIRAGE MAN: BRUCE 
IVINS, THE ANTHRAX ATTACKS, AND AMERICA’S RUSH TO WAR (Bantam Books 2011) (stating that 
many resources were used during the seven-year FBI investigation of Bruce Ivins). 
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underscores the crucial importance not only of public health readiness but 
of basic science in controlling dangerous disease outbreaks, however they 
emerge.”114 
The failure of the government to allow a proper closure to the story 
makes it even more tragic. While the circumstantial evidence against Dr. 
Ivins was convincing, many technical questions about the investigation still 
remain.115 The last opportunity for an open court trial of the case 
evaporated when the Department of Justice settled out of court with Mrs. 
Maureen Stevens, the rightfully distraught wife of Robert Stevens, the Florida 
man whose illness and death resulted from inhalation of anthrax spores.116 
IV.  DOMESTIC RESPONSE 
A. The U.S. Biosecurity Build Up 
In response to the anthrax letters, Congress quickly went beyond the 
1997 Select Agent Rule. Under the USA PATRIOT Act and the Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, 
registration was required of individual scientists with laboratory access to the 
Select Agents.117 For the first time, we were licensing scientists to work with a 
defined set of pathogens. However, this license was not meant to protect 
public safety, dependent on competence like a driver’s license, it was about 
public security and included background checks much like the one the FBI 
had conducted when they cleared Dr. Ivins long before he became a 
suspect in the anthrax letters investigation. One person had apparently sent 
the anthrax letters, but all scientists in a class were subject to these new laws. 
We may never know how much safer the laws have made us, but many 
 
 114. GUILLEMIN, supra note 39. 
 115. See REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES USED DURING THE FBI’S INVESTIGATION OF 
THE 2001 ANTHRAX LETTERS, COMM. ON SCI., TECH., & LAW, POLICY & GLOBAL AFFAIRS DIV., 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNSEL OF THE NAT’L ACADS. (2011) (stating that many technical questions 
remain regarding the FBI’s investigation of the 2001 anthrax letters). 
 116. Scott Shane, U.S. Settles Suit Over Anthrax Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, November 29, 2011, 
at A19. 
 117. Kunal J. Rambhia et al., Everywhere You Look: Select Agent Pathogens, 9 BIOSECUIRTY 
& BIOTERROISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE & SCI. 70 (2011), available at http://www.up 
mc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2011/pdf/2011-03-03-select_agent_path 
ogens.pdf. Other than variola virus, the etiologic agent of smallpox, the select agents were all 
widely available in nature, and continue to be. See id. at 70. Note that SARS Corona virus has 
been added to the list as well as some of the influenza viruses, not necessarily available in 
nature. Id. at 69-70. 
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believe they have had a negative impact on scientific progress, and even 
biosecurity.118 
The DOD borrowed a term and an approach from our nuclear weapons 
labs in drafting Army Regulation 50-1,119 which was implemented in draft 
form in 2004, the approved regulation signed on July 28, 2008, ironically 
one day before Dr. Ivins’ suicide.120 The new regulation overlaid on 
infectious disease research what had been the government’s approach to 
safety and security in laboratories with nuclear weapons and chemical 
warfare agents. While the nuclear and chemical programs were conducted 
primarily in what might be called government security labs, biological surety 
would eventually impact public health, academic, and industrial labs as 
well. 
“Biological Surety,” a system of regulations and practices used for years 
in nuclear weapons labs and chemical defense labs, includes: (1) Biological 
Safety, (2) Biological Security, (3) Agent Accountability, and (4) Personnel 
Reliability.121 The principles of Biological Safety were developed at Camp 
Detrick and have been embraced by infectious disease scientists for many 
years. Biological Security, often affectionately called “Guns, Gates, and 
Guards,” sometimes poses minor inefficiencies for the laboratory scientists, 
but for the most part they do not mind those inconveniences or the closed 
circuit cameras in their labs. Agent Accountability, like other good ideas in 
the nuclear model, turned out to be impossible to implement in biology. The 
requirements to account for the quantity of organisms in one’s lab day to 
day was scaled back somewhat after essentially shutting down the lab for 
several months. Finally, Personnel Reliability involves interviews, reporting, 
medical history checks, and other personally invasive actions.122 
 
 118. Arturo Casadevall & David A. Relman, Microbial Threat Lists: Obstacles in the Quest 
for Biosecurity?, 8 NATURE REVIEWS: MICROBIOLOGY 83, 153 (2010), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20065941. 
 119. See DEPT. OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 50-1, BIOLOGICAL SURETY: NUCLEAR AND 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MATERIAL (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar 
50-1.pdf [hereinafter AR 50-1]. 
 120. See David Willman, Senators Question FBI’s Handling of Anthrax Probe, L.A. TIMES, 
September 18, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/18/nation/na-anthrax18. 
 121. ARMY BIOSURETY PROGRAM, U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH AND MATERIEL COMMAND, 1-
2 (2000), available at http://mrmc.amedd.army.mil/assets/docs/media/biosuretyComm 
Plan.pdf. Biological Safety is protecting the scientists and the community around a laboratory 
from the microbes. Biological Security is protecting the microbes from those who might misuse 
them. Agent Accountability is keeping a “real time” account of quantities of microbes. 
Personal Reliability is attempting to assure that no laboratory worker or other individual with 
access to the microbes is the kind of person who might use microbes to cause harm. Id. 
 122. See AR 50-1, supra note 121, at 5. 
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But our response as a government was not over; we were primed by the 
horrific events of 9/11. We will never know how we would have responded 
to the anthrax letters in isolation of these events. In 1997, the entire U.S. 
Government’s budget for biodefense was $137 million, and this was all 
within the DOD.123 In 1998, the CDC received $148 million for diagnostics 
and public health lab upgrades, education of healthcare responders, and 
the stockpiling of medical countermeasures in the Strategic National 
Stockpile.124 By 2002, the U.S. Government was spending $4.1 billion total 
for biosecurity.125 While the DOD’s budget for medical countermeasures 
research remained flat after doubling in 1998, the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS), previously only collaborating at the periphery of 
medical biological defense, received a significant plus-up, mostly within the 
NIH’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID). A few 
years later, the NIAID would announce the award of grants to academic 
consortia for basic research to develop countermeasures.126 The initiative 
would include the construction of two BSL-4 labs and, planned at the time, 
13 BSL-3 labs,127 mostly on campuses located regionally across the U.S. 
The media and fellow scientists from other disciplines asked many questions 
during those years. The most common was, “Do we really need all these 
new high-containment labs?” It was at this time that a group of more than 
700 scientists formally protested the massive spending at the expense of 
more important research.128 
B. Surprises in Biology 
While the media was asking questions, the science community was also 
watching the greatly increased number of scientists who were working with 
the agents formerly limited to USAMRIID, the CDC labs in Atlanta, and a 
handful of contractor labs. We, the biological science community, began 
 
 123. DAVID R. FRANZ, THREATS AND RISKS TO U.S. AGRICULTURE: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2005), 
available at http://fss.k-state.edu/featuredContent/PDF/Franz20050219.pdf. 
 124. This information comes from my personal recollection. 
 125. Crystal Franco & Tara Kirk Sell, Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2010-
FY2011, 8 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE, & SCI. 129, 130 
(2010), available at http://www.upmchealthsecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2010 
/2010-06-14-biodefensefunding.html. See also Schuler, supra note 17, at 87, 90. 
 126. Biocontainment Laboratories, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/biosecuri 
ty/resource/research.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 6, at 4. 
 127. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 6, at 4 (explaining information 
regarding containment labs and Biosafety Levels). 
 128. Sidney Altman et al., An Open Letter to Elias Zerhouni, 307 SCI., Mar. 4, 2005, at 
1409-10, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/307/5714/1396.summary?sid=f 
942d78a-7e22-4748-8047-a0d14d67c18e. 
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wondering aloud where all this was headed. Further, considering new risks, 
we began to wonder if we should take issues upon ourselves before 
someone with a poorer understanding of the complex challenges and the 
possible outcomes did it for us. The Fink Committee of the National 
Academies of Science considered this issue from April 2002 – January 
2003.129 The resulting report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of 
Terrorism: The Dual Use Dilemma, released to the public in 2004, became 
a signpost in the discussion between biological science and security, and in 
addition to the findings and recommendations, the Report’s “Experiments of 
Concern”130 live on as stated below. This list of experiments has become the 
legacy of the Fink Report and should be given special attention before they 
are begun, as they are seven examples of research that might be misused:  
1) Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective. 
2) Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or 
antiviral drugs. 
3) Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a non-
pathogen virulent. 
4) Would increase transmissibility of a pathogen. 
5) Would alter the host range of a pathogen. 
6) Would enable the evasion of diagnostic and detection modalities. 
7) Would enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin.131 
Finally, the committee’s recommendation that the U.S. Government 
form a national-level board bringing together biological scientists and 
security professionals to report to HHS became a reality when the NSABB 
was chartered in 2004.132 The stated mission of the NSABB, a Federal 
Advisory Committee,133 was to “provide advice, guidance, and leadership 
 
 129. See FINK REPORT, supra note 20, at vii- viii (2004). 
 130. Id. at viii, 5. These are also sometimes referred to as the “Fink Seven Deadly Sins.” 
 131. Id. Experiment #7 regarding facilitating weaponization might be considered one 
which should not be done, although the BWC might allow it in small quantities for 
“prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.” Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
and on their Destruction, art. 1, ¶1, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163, 
available at http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc/text [hereinafter BWC]. The point is that 
the Committee did not intend to automatically ban all seven of the experiments listed, but to 
ask the community of scientists to consider them carefully before undertaking such research. 
See FINK REPORT, supra note 20, at 36. 
 132. FINK REPORT, supra note 20, at 9. See also DANA A. SHEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
supra note 26, at 4. 
 133. See WENDY R. GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SVC., FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES: AN 
OVERVIEW 1 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40520.pdf. Often called a 
“FACA,” it is a type of committee assembled by a government agency to allow non-
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regarding biosecurity oversight of dual use research, defined as biological 
research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a 
biologic threat to public health and/or national security.”134 
C. The NSABB and DUR 
The NSABB held public meetings from its inception. Several internal 
subgroups were formed initially to focus on particular topics such as, criteria 
for identifying DUR, codes of conduct for life sciences researchers, 
responsible communication of dual use life sciences research, biosecurity 
issues raised by synthetic genomics and international collaboration for 
oversight of DUR.135 Some of these were dissolved and new ones 
established as needs changed or new questions arose over the years. The 
NSABB met as needed in plenary and the subcommittees met more often. 
Typically, the subcommittees drafted recommendations and then the full 
board edited and formally approved each before sending them from the 
NIH to HHS. From HHS, the approved recommendations were sent to the 
White House, where the real customer was the National Security Staff. 
The International Engagement Subcommittee, which I co-chaired from 
the beginning, held a series of international meetings in Washington, D.C. 
The largest meeting, in November 2008, involved representatives from 37 
countries.136 At each meeting, we introduced the NSABB and explained the 
challenges concerning DURC as we understood them, then sought to gain 
perspective regarding perceptions of the DURC issues, common challenges, 
and potential solutions from our partners.137 The reports of the early 
meetings are available on the NSABB’s website.138 In recent years, after the 
face-to-face international meetings became too large and too expensive, we 
held a series of webinars with local experts from major global regions. 
 
governmental Subject Matter Experts to advise the government without conflict. The law 
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607/Criteria%20Working%20Group.pdf. 
 136. NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY, SUSTAINING PROGRESS IN THE LIFE 
SCIENCES: STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN 1 (2008), available at 
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 137. See id. at 2. 
 138. See Office of Biotechnology Activities, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, http://oba.od.nih.gov/ 
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Recordings of these broadcasts are also available on the NSABB’s 
website.139 
The most relevant and comprehensive document produced by the 
NSABB was the June 2007 report entitled, Proposed Framework for the 
Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the 
Potential Misuse of Research Information.140 This end-to-end roadmap 
overlaid the concept and awareness of DURC on the life sciences’ 
fundamental research. Further, this report gave the U.S. Government and 
NIH the first and best globally available guidebook for dealing with the 
complexities pertaining to discovery and responsibility in the life sciences 
and technical security related surprises. 
D. Back to the Letters 
In August 2002, not long after Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a scientist at 
the State University of New York at Purchase, and closely affiliated with the 
Federation of American Scientists, published and discussed with the media 
her numerous and varied hypotheses mostly proposing U.S. Government 
employees as the perpetrators,141 Attorney General John Ashcroft stated in a 
press conference that Dr. Steven Hatfill was a “person of interest” in the 
anthrax letters case.142 While Dr. Hatfill vehemently denied involvement, the 
FBI continued to pursue him. At one point in 2003, the FBI even drove over 
Dr. Hatfill’s foot143 and agents also showed up at his significant other’s 
home and “trashed” it, apparently searching for evidence.144 In 2003, Dr. 
Hatfill filed a lawsuit against Ashcroft, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and 
several media outlets.145 The negotiations went on for more than five years, 
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/summary.asp?Live=10326 (last visited Oct. 11, 2013). 
 140. See NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
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 142. Complaint at 19-20, Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F.Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2005) (No. 
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F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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but in June 2008, the U.S. Government exonerated Dr. Hatfill and 
announced a settlement of $4.6 million.146 
In July 2005, Dr. Hatfill filed a lawsuit against the New York Times and 
Nicholas D Kristof, a New York Times reporter, for statements Kristof 
published suggesting that Hatfill was the “likely culprit.”147 This case was 
dismissed on summary judgment on January 12, 2007, based on the fact 
that Dr. Hatfill was a public figure and had not proven malice on the part of 
the New York Times.148 Dr. Hatfill also filed a lawsuit against Donald 
Foster,149 a forensic linguist who had stated in a 2003 Reader’s Digest 
article that Hatfill’s travels and the postmarks on certain anthrax hoax letters 
closely correlated.150 That suit was apparently settled out of court. Soon after 
the 2003 lawsuit that Hatfill filed against the DOJ, the FBI began to focus its 
attention on Dr. Ivins, an anthrax vaccine specialist at USAMRIID.151 As the 
questioning and surveillance of Dr. Ivins’ family and himself continued, the 
pressure on the FBI to solve the nearly seven-year-old case intensified. 
During this time, we learned much more about the life of the hard-working 
and selfless, but quirky scientist so many of us knew. On the morning of 
August 2, 2008, the Frederick News Post opened with the headline: 
“Anthrax Case Turns.”152 Dr. Ivins had committed suicide. 
V.  THEY ARE RELATED 
A. DURC and the Insider Threat 
The anthrax letters were not an example of DURC. However, they are 
believed by many to have been the result of a lone insider’s action –– 
whether that insider was from USAMRIID or another legitimate government 
or non-government laboratory. The best approaches to preventing either the 
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DURC release or insider attack are likely very similar. Tighter regulation of 
an entire class of individuals, whatever their knowledge, experience, or 
access to technical tools, is unlikely to prevent another similar act by an 
unethical, uncaring, unstable, or criminal mind. Yet, new regulation has 
been the dominant response by the U.S. Government. 
Within ten days after Dr. Ivins’ death, U.S. House of Representatives 
John Dingell and Bart Stupak wrote to President George W. Bush: 
If these allegations are true, the FBI has identified serious weaknesses in the 
security at one of our Nation’s premier laboratories for the study of some of 
the most deadly pathogens in the world. Their allegations also raise equally 
troubling security concerns about the thousands of other scientists and 
technicians who work at hundreds of labs across our country with ‘select 
biological agents’ such as anthrax.153 
1. Washington Studies the Problem 
During 2009, four national-level studies would be undertaken to 
consider the insider threat with each of the studies funded by the U.S. 
Government.154 Three of the committees were made up of senior non-
government advisors, and the fourth, of civilian and uniformed government 
employees. 
The Defense Science Board’s study, Department of Defense Biological 
Safety and Security Program, published in May 2009, acknowledged the 
difficulty of preventing the insider threat.155 It suggested, first, to use a red 
teaming approach to understand the vulnerabilities and assure security of 
laboratory computer systems.156 Second, to monitor activities without undue 
impact on the research process and to conduct “periodic meetings with 
laboratory personnel to reinforce values, moral obligations, and 
observations that should be reported.”157 Third, to tailor any Personnel 
Reliability Program (PRP) for biological research, rather than simply overlay 
the nuclear model.158 Fourth, to use DOD background investigations for 
host country personnel working in high-containment U.S. Government labs 
outside the U.S.159 Fifth, to combine the many current compliance 
inspections with a single, independent inspection team made up of 
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experienced individuals.160 Sixth, to review the usefulness of the current 
“two-person rule” for insider threats,161 and to use the “lost in the crowd 
rule” for shipping Biological Select Agent and Toxins between labs.162 Lastly, 
to keep the public involved and informed by communicating regularly, 
particularly regarding mission, safety measures, and emergency response 
plans.163 
Also, in May 2009, the NSABB released a study, Enhancing the 
Personnel Reliability of Persons with Select Agent Access.164 The Board 
addressed PRPs, which are programs traditionally focused on insider threat. 
The report made five key recommendations. First, to enhance extant PRP, 
but stated that a national PRP is unnecessary at this time.165 Second, to 
strengthen the current FBI Security Risk Assessment (SRA),166 but to do so 
efficiently so as not to impede the recruitment of researchers.167 Third, to 
enhance the culture of responsibility and accountability, which it noted as 
the best defense against the insider threat.168 Fourth, to encourage 
professional societies to get involved, continue the dialogue, and “foster 
community-based solutions.”169 Fifth, to reduce or stratify the list of Select 
Agents and Toxins, thereby focusing on the most important agents.170 
In July 2009, HHS released Report of the Trans-Federal Task Force on 
Optimizing Biosafety and Biocontainment Oversight.171 The task force 
recommended improved coordination of oversight activities, “encourage[d] 
 
 160. DEF. SCI. BD., supra note 157, at 45. 
 161. Id. See JAMES LEDUC ET AL., POTENTIAL IMPACT OF A 2-PERSON SECURITY RULE ON 
BIOSAFETY LEVEL 4 LABORATORY WORKERS 15(7) (July 2009), available at http://wwwnc.cdc. 
gov/eid/article/15/7/08-1523_article.htm (“two-person rule” requires that no single 
individual work in a laboratory alone). 
 162. DEF. SCI. BD., supra note 157, at 40. (“lost in the crowd” is the concept of using plain 
or routine packaging for mailing valuable, or in this case potentially amusable, materials, so 
that the package will not be identifiable as usual or different). 
 163. Id. 
 164. NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, ENHANCING PERSONNEL RELIABILITY AMONG 
INDIVIDUALS WITH ACCESS TO SELECT AGENTS 1 (May 2009), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/ 
biosecurity/meetings/200905T/NSABB%20Final%20Report%20on%20PR%205-29-09.pdf. 
 165. Id. at 6. 
 166. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, BIOTERRORISM SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT FORM (FD-
961), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/bioterrorism-security-risk-assessment-form 
/bioterrorism-security-risk-assessment-form-fd-961. 
 167. Id. at 12. 
 168. Id. at 13. 
 169. Id. at 15. 
 170. Id. at 16. 
 171. ASS’T SEC’Y OF PREPAREDNESS & REPSONSE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
REPORT OF THE TRANS-FEDERAL TASK FORCE ON OPTIMIZING BIOSAFETY AND BIOCONTAINMENT 
OVERSIGHT (July 2009) available at https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/boards/biosafe 
tytaskforce/Documents/transfedbiocontainmentrpt092009.pdf. 
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a robust culture of accountability characterized by individual and 
institutional compliance” with policies, development of a national strategy 
for training and technical competence in containment lab research, 
obtaining and analyzing data from laboratory accidents and incidents, and 
assuring that biosafety and biocontainment regulations were current.172 The 
taskforce also recommended the development of an “agricultural equivalent 
of the [Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories] BMBL,” 
development of a “national research agenda for applied biosafety and 
biocontainment,” and, finally, “improve[d] sharing of strategies to ensure 
effective public communication and outreach.”173 
Finally, in September 2009, the U.S. National Academies of Science 
released the report, Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and 
Toxins.174 Like the other three reports above, it made recommendations for 
improving the security within our laboratories.175 First, laboratory leadership 
and the Select Agent Program should foster a “culture of trust and 
responsibility.”176 Second, a biological select agents and toxins advisory 
committee should be formed to provide continual oversight of the list of 
related regulations.177 Third, the Select Agents list should be stratified and 
provisions developed for timely inclusion or removal of an agent from the 
list.178 Fourth, accountability for agent materials should focus on archived 
stocks, but not working materials, and counting of vials should not be 
employed for agents that replicate.179 Fifth, the FBI’s Security Risk 
Assessment requirement should be maintained, but with an appeals 
process.180 Sixth, regulatory obligations should be clarified by defining 
“minimum cross-agency physical security requirements.”181 Seventh, an 
“independent evaluation of the Select Agent Program should be 
undertaken” and, lastly, inspectors should be mandated to have scientific 
and laboratory knowledge and experience, and training and inspections 
should be harmonized.182 
 
 172. Id. at 87, 94, 103. 
 173. Id. at 109, 122, 125. 
 174. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH WITH 
BIOLOGICAL SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS (2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/ 
books/NBK44956/pdf/TOC.pdf. 
 175. Id. at 89. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 107. 
 178. Id. at 112. 
 179. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 176, at 115. 
 180. Id. at 83. 
 181. Id. at 123. 
 182. Id. at 127, 130. 
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2. Much Has Been Accomplished 
In addition to clarifying the challenges and formulating alternative 
strategies, the NSABB quickly engaged the science and policy communities 
both domestically and internationally. Academic centers and traditional non-
governmental organizations began training. International outreach 
programs were begun and the U.S. Departments of State, Defense and 
Energy, and the FBI funded efforts to do the same. The focus of most of the 
outreach programs was on training of laboratory risk assessment and risk 
reduction, DURC, biosafety, and biosecurity. In recent years, as some of our 
international colleagues have pushed back against suggestions for DURC 
training and biological security training, the U.S. training teams have 
emphasized the better accepted term, “responsible life sciences research.” 
Where ambassadors of DURC have engaged their international colleagues 
as equals and worked jointly to address the issues, positive relationships of 
understanding and trust have often resulted. 
3. An Incomplete Response 
Although much has been accomplished, domestically there has been 
little emphasis on the role of healthy cultures within laboratories to counter 
the potential for accidental misapplications or intentional misuses of 
biological technologies by those possessing relevant knowledge. The broad 
positive, prophylactic impact that enlightened leadership can play is 
apparently either not fully appreciated or assumed away, which has led to a 
continued lack of emphasis on the role of leadership. 
Note that each of the 2009 reports made some mention of the 
importance of leadership, cultures of responsibility, accountability and trust, 
and values and moral obligations.183 Yet to date, government laws, 
regulations, and even guidelines show little attention or investment in 
improving or even encouraging the kind of leadership that fosters such 
values.184 Regulatory solutions, increased oversight, and assignment of 
responsibility without commensurate authority remain the norm. Regulations 
that lend themselves to check-box management by contractors have 
proliferated. Enlightened leadership fostering cultural change is difficult to 
scale and its impact difficult to measure. Busy regulators typically move on 
to other things after a single vote. The approaches recently taken by the 
government are much more likely to result in disgruntled, rather than happy 
 
 183. See NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, supra note 166, at v; ASS’T SEC’Y OF 
PREPAREDNESS & REPSONSE, supra note 173, at 10-11; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L 
ACAD., supra note 176, at 89. 
 184. David R. Franz & James W. LeDuc, Balancing our Approach to the Insider Threat, 9 
BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 205, 206 (2011). 
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employees. These solutions are also less likely to contribute to a culture of 
trust and openness. There is no convincing evidence that these approaches 
make our citizens safer. 
In an example of another extremely complex challenge, protecting New 
York City from terrorists, a data set appears to be developing that suggests 
behavioral approaches and community policing with much less disruption to 
the lives of law-abiding citizens is working. The system has interrupted a 
number of terrorist plots in recent years.185 By building human relationships 
of trust, or at least respect, law enforcement can improve both its situational 
awareness as well as interdict would-be malevolent actors before they can 
bring harm to the community. 
VI.  TECHNICAL SURPRISE OR ETHICAL LAPSE? 
A. H5N1 
In September 2011, Dr. Ron Fouchier, Ph.D., of the Erasmus University 
Medical Center in Rotterdam, Netherlands, described his NIH-funded work 
with the H5N1 influenza virus.186 The NIH funded similar research in the 
laboratory of Dr. Yoshihiro Kawaoka, Ph.D., at the University of Wisconsin-
Madison. Both grants were financed to develop mutant strains of the H5N1 
influenza virus that would be transmissible to mammals.187 During a meeting 
of the European Scientific Working Group on Influenza in Malta,188 Dr. 
Fouchier described his successful development as “very bad news”189 and 
the viral product as “efficiently transmitted as seasonal [flu] virus.”190 In the 
November 2011, publication of Science, Dr. Fouchier described what he 
had developed as “probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can 
make.”191 Shortly thereafter, Dr. Fouchier and Dr. Kawaoka submitted 
 
 185. Judith Miller, Op-Ed., How to Stop Terrorists before They Kill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 
2013, at A15. 
 186. INFLUENZA TIMES, (European Scientific Working Group on Influenza (ESWI), Malta), 
Sep. 11-14, 2011, http://labs.fhcrc.org/cbf/Papers/H5N1_docs/FEIC_news_from_Malta.pdf. 
 187. Bryan Walsh, H5N1 Paper Published: Deadly, Transmissible Bird Flu Could Be Closer 
than Thought, TIME HEALTHLAND BLOG (May 3, 2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/05/ 
03/h5n1-paper-published-deadly-transmissible-bird-flu-could-be-closer-than-thought/. 
 188. INFLUENZA TIMES, supra note 188. 
 189. Katherine Harmon, What Really Happened in Malta This September When 
Contagious Bird Flu Was First Announced, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Dec. 30, 2011), http://blogs.Scien 
tificamerican.com/observations/2011/12/30/what-really-happened-in-malta-this-september-
when-contagious-bird-flu-was-first-announced/. 
 190. INFLUENZA TIMES, supra note 188. 
 191. Martin Enserink, Controversial Studies Give a Deadly Flu Virus Wings, 334 SCI. 1192, 
1192 (2011). 
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manuscripts describing their findings to Science and Nature.192 Concerned 
that the papers contained DURC relevant information, the editors asked the 
NSABB to review them.193 The NSABB met in plenary while sub-group 
sessions spent tens of hours discussing the papers.194 In addition, influenza 
experts from government laboratories were consulted and safety and security 
implications concerning the draft manuscripts were considered.195 
Finally, in late December of 2011, the NSABB made recommendations 
that a small amount of key information regarding the sequences that were 
used and/or discovered should be redacted from the publications, that the 
redacted information be made available to the global science community 
on a need-to-know basis, and that the manuscripts and implications of 
publication be discussed with key experts in the international science 
community.196 In addition, the NSABB proposed a three-month moratorium 
on further publication and/or presentation of work with these viruses.197 
In February 2012, in response to the NSABB, the U.S. Government 
helped organize a meeting with the World Health Organization (WHO) at its 
headquarters in Geneva.198 Attendance included NSABB chair, U.S. 
Government science leaders, the authors of the two papers in question, and 
representatives from other countries (Indonesia, China, The Netherlands, 
France, Australia, Vietnam, U.K., Hong Kong, and South Africa).199 At this 
meeting, new data was presented and Dr. Fouchier described the results 
with more modest interpretation than he had in the prior months.200 The 
meeting ended with the following consensus: the findings contribute to our 
ability to conduct surveillance and to understand pathogenesis, and they 
highlight safety and security concerns.201 Further, the group concluded that 
 
 192. Lauren Neergaard, U.S.: Don’t Publish Lab-Bred Bird Flu Recipe, NBCNEWS.COM 
(Dec. 20, 2011, 1:48 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/45738690/ns/health-cold_and_flu/t/ 
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 193. See id. 
 194. See id. 
 195. Press Release, Nat’l Inst. of Health, Press Statement on the NSABB Review of H1N1 
Research (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/dec2011/od-20.htm. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Martin Enserink, U.S. Biosecurity Panel May Call for Asilomar-Style Moratorium on 
H5N1 Papers, SCI. INSIDER, (Dec. 23, 2011, 1:10 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/2011/ 
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 198. News Release, World Health Org., Public Health, Influenza Experts Agree 
H5N1Research Critical, But Extend Delay (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/ 
news/releases/2012/h5n1_research_20120217/en/. 
 199. List of Participants, Technical Consultation on H5N1 Research Issues, WORLD HEALTH 
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redaction and limited distribution is not feasible, the mutant viruses should 
be kept in the labs, the moratorium should continue in effect, and work of 
this type should be supported in the future.202 
In March 2012, the two authors and their journal editors then met with 
the NSABB and the Directors of the NIH and the National Institute of Allergy 
and Infectious Disease (NIAID).203 The NSABB was allowed to read the latest 
versions of Dr. Fouchier’s and Dr. Kawaoka’s manuscripts and hear oral 
presentations from the authors as well.204 After a period of discussion, the 
NSABB voted unanimously in support of the publication of Kawaoka’s paper 
and with simple majority to publish Fouchier’s.205 Although both authors’ 
works were eventually published, the long-term solutions to this complex 
DURC issue are far from clear.206 
B. Thoughts on the H5N1 Episode 
Earlier, I described DURC as a technical surprise. Actually, the Fink 
Report’s experiments concerning the seven deadly sins could be undertaken 
intentionally or discovered by surprise. Historically, what we call DURC 
today probably occurred more by surprise than by plan. In this age of 
biotechnology, it is likely that DURC experiments may result more from plan 
than surprise; although our knowledge in this field is still relatively primitive, 
we know a lot more now than we did in the 1960s. The H5N1 studies were 
intentionally conducted with the goal to accomplish what was in fact done, 
and were funded by HHS, the same U.S. Government department that 
produced the 2007, NSABB Report, Proposed Framework for the Oversight 
of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential 
Misuse of Research Information.207 The U.S. Government received and 
funded the research that it requested. 
Dr. Fouchier’s and Dr. Kawaoka’s flu manuscripts were a tactical 
challenge, and I believe we learned a lot in the process of dealing with 
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 203. Statement of the NSABB, Nat’l Sci. Advisory Bd. for Biosecurity, Meeting of the 
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to Review Revised Manuscripts on 
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 204. See Ron Fouchier et al., The Fight Over Flu, 481 NATURE 257, 257 (2012). See also 
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20, 20 (2012). 
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them. But our future safety and security depends on us.208 My notes, jotted 
down during the early deliberations, show that I believed the ferret was a 
good model of the human for transmission studies; it was not clear what the 
ferret model in these experiments told us about virulence or pathogenicity in 
humans following aerosol exposure; my concern was more about safety 
than security; we were playing Russian roulette, potentially releasing a 
mammal transmissible H5 subtype virus into the global petri dish where 
pigs, chickens, ducks, and humans live together; it was important to share 
these findings with the international science community, and the U.S. 
Government could never censor global science communication. Jim LeDuc, 
Ph.D., Director of the National Biocontainment Laboratory at the University 
of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, and I described our concerns about 
safety in a subsequent commentary.209 
If the two manuscripts were a tactical challenge, we all share the 
strategic challenge as well. The U.S. Government responded to this incident 
with new draft guidelines in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of 
government departments and agencies knowingly funding research with a 
significant DURC outcome as we did this time, or at least doing it more 
thoughtfully next time.210 After a period of public debate, the guidelines 
were approved and published by NIH in August of 2013.211 There remains 
little doubt that we will see future surprises in biological research, some of 
which might pose significant safety risks to humans, animals, or the 
environment, and some that might even be exploited by those who would do 
harm. Future DURC surprises will be ever more likely to come from outside 
the U.S. because of the global proliferation of capabilities and knowledge. 
Therefore, it is critical we work closely with our international colleagues to 
help them learn from our mistakes. In addition, it is important to learn from 
their experience and to increase the likelihood that we quickly learn of any 
surprises when they occur around the globe. 
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VII.  REGULATORY AND BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES 
A. No Technical Solution 
Noble laureate, Joshua Lederberg, Ph.D., long-time thought leader and 
advisor to the government on matters of biological defense, said to Richard 
Preston in a 1998 New Yorker interview, “There is no technical solution to 
the problem of biological weapons. It needs an ethical, human, and moral 
solution if it’s going to happen at all. Don’t ask me what the odds are for an 
ethical solution, but there is no other solution.”212 Then Dr. Lederberg 
paused and said, “But would an ethical solution appeal to a sociopath?”213 
Dr. Lederberg was talking about biological weapons at the time, but the 
concept applies as well to DURC and the insider threat. I consider 
regulatory fixes, such as those we have seen, and check-box management 
to be technical solutions. No one questions the importance of management 
and regulations or dependence on regulatory schemes, which help make us 
safer. However, overlooking or back-shelving the behavioral ones is done at 
our peril. We have put in place numerous legal and regulatory systems, 
both internationally and domestically, over the years. Some target biological 
warfare by nation states, some target terrorism, some the insider threat, and 
more recently, DURC. Some academic centers and non-governmental 
organizations have underscored ethics in the course of biosafety-biosecurity 
training, but the value of leadership in the context of organizational culture 
has been terribly underappreciated by our government. 
VIII.  INTERNATIONAL 
The following is a list of relevant international laws, agreements, norms, 
and regulations related to biological security. Included is a brief description 
of the intention of the drafters and the content of the regulatory tool relevant 
to this discussion. With the exception of the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC) of 1972, most were put in place in the last 30 years, roughly the 
period addressed by this article. 
A. The BWC of 1972 
The BWC was signed in 1972, and ratified in 1975.214 Currently, it is 
signed by 170 states and serves as a supplement to the 1925 Geneva 
Convention, which prohibited the use of biological and chemical 
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weapons.215 The BWC prohibits the development, production, and 
stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons.216 Article I of the BWC allows 
research with weapons agents, but prohibits production and stockpiling 
agents “of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
protective, or other peaceful purposes.”217 Article III prohibits assisting 
another nation in the acquisition of biological weapons, and Article X 
exhorts the signatories to encourage the “peaceful uses of biological science 
and technology.”218 
B. United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 on Iraq 
Adopted in April 1991, this resolution was the basis and legal authority 
for the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) to govern inspections 
of biological, chemical, nuclear, and missiles/weapons sites in the 
country.219 It authorized the removal and destruction of all chemical and 
biological weapons and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 
kilometers.220 The resolution represented the terms Iraq was required to 
comply with after the First Gulf War.221 
C. The Trilateral Agreement 
This agreement, signed in 1992, by the U.S., U.K., and Russia, was an 
attempt by the U.S. and U.K. to gain information regarding the Union of 
Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR) massive biological weapons program and 
to assure that subsequent biological weapons activities did not continue.222 
Implementation of this agreement is considered to have been a failure, 
primarily because Russia was unwilling to acknowledge their former 
biological weapons activities. The process demonstrated the extreme 
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difficulty in using traditional arms control procedures and methods in 
biological facilities, many of which can be used for either legitimate or 
malevolent purposes. 
D. UNSCR 1540 
Published in April 2004, this resolution obligates states to “develop and 
enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against the proliferation 
of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their means 
of delivery” with particular attention given to avoiding proliferation of 
weapons capabilities to non-state actors.223 It also requires states to 
establish criminal penalties for involvement in weapons by certain non-state 
actors.224 Of special interest therefore, and in contrast to the BWC, UNSCR 
1540 places emphasis on reducing the likelihood that non-state actors will 
acquire weapons of mass destruction.225 
E. International Health Regulations (IHR) of 2005 
Entered into force in 2007, as a legal instrument binding on more than 
190 countries, the IHR requires countries to report certain disease outbreaks 
and public health events to the WHO.226 In addition, countries are required 
to strengthen their existing capacities for disease surveillance.227 While the 
IHRs are not directed at biological warfare or terrorism, it is believed that 
this global early warning system will make all nations more secure by 
increasing the likelihood that outbreaks or biological attacks will be 
discovered as quickly as possible so intervention can begin, thus saving 
lives. 
IX.  U.S. DOMESTIC 
The following is a list of relevant U.S. domestic laws, agreements, 
norms, and regulations related to biological security. Included is a brief 
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description of the intention of the drafters and the content of the regulatory 
tool relevant to this discussion. 
A. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
Effective June 1996, Title V, Subtitle B, Section 511 addresses biological 
weapons.228 It makes it a federal crime to threaten, conspire, or use a 
biological weapon, it expands on definitions of the categories of agents, 
modifies, and adds definitions regarding biological weapons, and directs 
the Secretary of HHS to develop and implement what became the Select 
Agent Rule of 1997.229 
B. Select Agent Rule of 1997 
This first iteration of the rule in 1997, made it illegal to transfer certain 
listed bacteria, viruses, or toxins between laboratories without the CDC’s 
approval.230 The agents could be held and used within the lab without 
permit.231 
C. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002 
Title II, Enhancing Controls on Dangerous Biological Agents and Toxins, 
gave the CDC regulatory control, regulation of transfer and possession over 
the Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT).232 It called for registration of 
persons who work with BSAT, laboratory inspections, mandated disclosure 
of information, civil penalties, and certain reporting requirements, including 
the requirement for notification in the case of an incident involving BSAT.233 
It codified the Select Agent Program of 2001.234 
 
 228. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 262 § 511(2006)). 
 229. Id. See also Select Agents and Toxins, WASH. STATE UNIV., (Aug. 16, 2013), 
http://www.bio-safety.wsu.edu/biosafety/toxins.asp. 
 230. 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(a)(1) (1997). See also Additional Requirements for Facilities 
Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, Centers of Disease Control and Prevention, (Nov. 23, 
2005), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/select_agent/42CFR_Additional_Requirements.pdf 
[hereinafter CDC]. 
 231. 42 C.F.R § 72.6(a)(1) (1997). See also CDC, supra note 231, at 15. 
 232. WASH. STATE UNIV., supra note 230. See also Ali S. Khan, Public Health Preparedness 
and Response in the USA since 9/11: A National Health Security Imperative, 378 THE LANCET 
953, 954 (2011) available at http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/documents/Lancet_Article_Sept 
2011.pdf. 
 233. General FAQ’s about Select Agents and Toxins, THE FED. SELECT AGENT PROGRAM, 
(Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.selectagents.gov/FAQ_General.html#sec1q2. 
 234. Id.; 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2013). See also Biosafety Policy, UNIV. OF ALA., (Aug. 16, 2013), 
http://bama.ua.edu/~ehs/Web%20Redo/BiolSaf.htm, 3. 
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D. The USA PATRIOT Act 
Effective February 2002, the full title of the act is Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.235 The act is wide-ranging, but with 
regard to biology, it has established a ten-year imprisonment and fine for 
anyone who cannot prove they are using a biological agent for 
“prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful 
purposes.”236 
E. Army Regulation 50-1 
The regulation entitled Biological Surety was enacted in draft form at 
USAMRIID in 2004, signed on July 28, 2008, and became effective on 
October 28, 2008.237 “Th[e] regulation prescribes policies, procedures, and 
responsibilities for the Army Biological Surety Program.”238 Initially, the 
regulation brought together Biological Safety, Biological Security, Agent 
Accountability, and Personnel Reliability in U.S. Army laboratories.239 The 
regulation was later applied to certain contractors and the Army Biological 
Defense Research Program.240 
F. United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual 
Use Research of Concern 
Released in draft form on March 29, 2012, the policy proposed to 
establish regular review of U.S. Government-funded or conducted research 
with a list of 15 selected pathogens including, highly pathogenic avian 
influenza, and/or seven categories of experiments of concern, very similar, 
but not identical to those listed in the Fink Report.241 The policy outlines 
 
 235. Uniting and Strenghtening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
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 236. 18 U.S.C. § 175(b) (2012). 
 237. AR 50-1, supra note 121; Gretchen L. Demmin, Biosurety, in MEDICAL ASPECTS OF 
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 543, 549, available at http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/borden/Portlet.as 
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 239. Id. § 9-4e at 30. 
 240. Id. §§ 1-5(7)b at 4, B-3(b)3 at 36. 
 241. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR 
OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN 1, 2 (2012), available at 
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department and agency responsibilities regarding review, risk assessment, 
risk mitigation, and reporting.242 This was the first formal document to bring 
together the Select Agent List and the Fink Report’s “Seven Deadly Sins.”243 
G. A Framework for Guiding U.S. HHS Funding Decisions about Research 
Proposals with the Potential for Generating Highly Pathogenic Avian 
Influenza H5N1 Viruses that are Transmissible among Mammals by 
Respiratory Droplets 
Released on February 21, 2013, by HHS, the framework calls for 
individual agencies, as well as HHS to perform robust reviews of proposals 
to determine risks and benefits for HHS-funded research anticipated to 
produce Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 viruses.244 It lists seven 
criteria to be used in the review and establishes a review process.245 
H. U.S. Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual 
Use Research of Concern 
A draft policy document was released for public comment on February 
22, 2013, to establish regular review of U.S. Government-funded or 
conducted research with a list of 15 selected pathogens including, highly 
pathogenic avian influenza, and/or seven categories of experiments similar 
to those listed in the Fink Report.246 This policy would require DURC 
oversight by institutions defined as “any government agency (Federal, State, 
or local), academic institution, corporation, company, partnership, society, 
association, firm, sole proprietorship, or other legal entity involved in 
 
APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN 
AGE OF TERRORISM: CONFRONTING THE DUAL USE DILEMMA 4 (2003). 
 242. DURC DRAFT POLICY, supra note 242, at 3-4. 
 243. An interesting regulatory approach and outcome, since the select agent list was 
developed for security reasons and the ‘seven deadly sins’ for DUR reasons. 
 244. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A FRAMEWORK FOR GUIDING UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES FUNDING DECISIONS ABOUT RESEARCH PROPOSALS 
WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR GENERATING HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA H5N1 VIRUSES THAT 
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 245. Id. at 5. 
 246. A copy of the proposed Policy is available on the U.S. Department of Health and 
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12369, 12371 (Feb. 22, 2013). 
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funding, conducting, or sponsoring research.”247 NIH released the policy in 
final form on August 28, 2013.248 
X.  REGULATORY APPROACHES: VALUE AND COST 
It is interesting to note, particularly on the domestic front, that the 
actions of a few have historically impacted the work of many. Mr. Harris, the 
anthrax letter mailer, and scientist communication of the H5N1 research 
have stimulated responses from our government in its effort to protect us. 
Actions to protect us have taken place in the name of public safety and 
security. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the 
Select Agent Rule, Army Regulation 50-1, and the new DURC policies are 
all domestic U.S. Government actions. These regulations are wide nets cast, 
rather than leadership-based approaches, to deal with troubled or frustrated 
personnel more broadly. Due to the nature of the dual use dilemma 
(technical surprise or ethical lapse) and insider threat (individual or small 
group sociopathic behavior), these wide cast, but superficial regulatory nets 
are, at best, very blunt instruments. Very few studies have looked at the 
productivity of the enterprise before and after 2001, but the subject deserves 
our attention.249 At least anecdotally, compliance with these regulatory 
approaches has forced laboratories to hire additional contractors to 
manage the programs, which has diverted funds from legitimate research, 
subsequently slowing progress.250 Even with these regulations in place, the 
U.S. Government cannot assure increased security. 
Possibly the greatest value in the international laws and resolutions is in 
their role as norms, tools of education, and awareness. Further, dialogues 
around international laws and resolutions have led to some increased 
understanding by bringing experts from many nations together to discuss 
them, as well as the visible boundary lines which they paint on the life 
sciences court. In other cases, the international laws have been barriers to 
communication and understanding. Regulations may do harm when they 
overburden the life sciences community or build walls internationally, 
instead of simply painting the boundary lines. Internationally, there have 
been more focused actions for nations who crossed the line: the Trilateral 
Agreements (because of Former Soviet Union behavior) and UNSCR 687 (in 
 
 247. See id. See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
POLICY FOR INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN 3-4 
(2013), https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/documents/oversight-durc.pdf. 
 248. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 211. 
 249. See, e.g., Arturo Casadevall & David A. Relman, Microbial Threat Lists: Obstacles in 
the Quest for Biosecurity?, 8 NATURE REVIEWS: MICROBIOLOGY 149-154 (2010). 
 250. This information comes from my personal communications with Col John Skvorak, 
DVM, PhD, the commander of USAMRIID (early 2010). 
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response to Iraqi behavior). Domestically, the individual acts listed above 
have increased oversight,251 and broad regulatory management has 
become the norm within the life sciences community. 
XI.  WHY SO LITTLE EMPHASIS ON LEADERSHIP? 
A. Leadership Models 
During the past 20 years, the role of leaders, particularly in U.S. 
Government laboratories where insider threats seem to be of greater 
concern than DURC, have changed dramatically. In this regard, the period 
before 9/11 can be clearly differentiated from the period after. In the past, 
laboratory leaders grew up within their organizations, took personal 
responsibility for their organizations, and molded laboratory cultures in a 
way that resulted in productivity and safety. Security was viewed differently 
before 9/11, but was appropriate for that day and time. Patriotism and 
teamwork were underlying principles, and the mission and focus on scientific 
ethics was the norm. 
Leaders who knew their organizations well also knew their people well 
enough to practice preventive intervention in the rare case of outlier 
behavior. The troubled scientist would seek out the leader for help if trust 
was there or the leader would observe and intervene in time if the leader 
was enlightened and appropriately engaged. Outlier employees were 
counseled and helped or weeded from the organization. A self-centered, 
arrogant, or insensitive manager would miss the warning signs, and thus, be 
unable to avert disaster. Such poor leaders did not last in those days. 
Today, there is much less thought given to these issues. Rather, much more 
time is spent trying to assure compliance with regulations. The challenge of 
heavy-handed regulation is also facing academic researchers in this country 
today.252 
B. Really Hard, but Rare Problems with No Perfect Solution 
We are dealing with two very hard problems in a very complex, even 
messy, world today. The spectrum of natural disease kills millions of people 
globally each year. Our government has focused enormous energy and 
treasure on hopefully rare, but potentially high-impact intentional events. 
 
 251. For example, in 2012 the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
Diseases (USAMRIID) had an inspector in the building between 90 and 120 working days, not 
including additional FDA inspectors. Personal Communication with Col Ben DeKoning, MD, 
U.S. Army Commander, USAMRIID (May 2013). 
 252. See Tobin L. Smith et al., Reforming Regulation of Research Universities: Regulatory 
and Reporting Requirements have become Excessively Burdensome. A More Balanced 
Approach is Needed, NATURE REVIEWS: MICROBIOLOGY, Summer 2011, at 57. 
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Much of this is related to the terror factor and the vast unknowns. Most 
Americans do not notice the deaths of 50,000 humans from seasonal 
influenza complications, 30,000 from auto accidents, or even the 10,000 
deaths associated with gun homicides annually, unless they involve one of 
our loved ones.253 Yet, the unknowns frighten us. As we face fiscal 
constraints nationally, the challenge is to balance our preparations and 
resolve regarding those vast unknowns. 
Dr. Lederberg told us “there is no technical solution.”254 He proposed 
ethical or moral solutions, but acknowledged that such personal controls 
would not appeal to an individual set on doing harm.255 Just as 
epidemiologists tell us that protecting a percentage of a population with a 
vaccine will indirectly protect unvaccinated individuals within a 
population,256 so too, establishing a corporate culture of responsibility will 
help reduce the likelihood that an individual within that culture will go 
astray. 
Secretary of the Navy, Richard Danzig, Ph.D., has told us that “we are 
driving in the dark” with regard to understanding the risk in national 
security.257 We cannot know what lies ahead. We have spent time and 
hundreds of millions of dollars trying to predict what is coming and for what 
to prepare.258 The insider threat is a very hard case while the DURC 
challenge is also difficult, but more easily dealt with. Interestingly, both 
respond to a very similar set of behavioral tools. We are much more likely to 
divert, dissuade, deter, or just discover individuals prone to either course in 
a healthy corporate culture than in an unhealthy one. So we get two-for-one 
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–– DURC and the insider threat –– protection in a healthy life sciences 
laboratory culture. 
C. Rethinking DURC: Did the Science Community Do the Right Thing? 
It’s not surprising that we have focused our energies on the 
technologies, the science, and the microbiological agents rather than on the 
behavior of the scientists. At the national level, our elected officials seek to 
do something to make the public feel safer, so they regulate what they 
cannot directly control. For DUR, it started with the beloved Fink Report, so 
we must bear part of the responsibility. When we called it DUR and listed 
the seven examples of research that might be misused, we forced ourselves 
to look at the technologies, the knowledge, and the science. If we had 
instead called for “Responsible Life Science Research,” the term now 
preferred by many of our international colleagues, we would have had to 
focus on human behavior. I believe more effective outcomes would have 
resulted if we had focused more on individual and corporate responsibility 
than on regulation to control technologies and knowledge. No matter if the 
individual scientist is armed with an oligonucleotide synthesizer or the 
organization with a freezer full of Select Agents, they are less likely to do 
harm with them in a healthy laboratory culture than an unhealthy one. 
D. Leadership and DURC or Actually “Responsible Life Sciences Research” 
Leadership is related only indirectly to DUR, but it is very much related to 
responsibility, which is the real problem. Leaders, by definition, demonstrate 
personal responsibility and they, by definition, develop cultures of 
responsibility in the organizations that they lead. Responsible organizations 
contribute, again with enormous influence by their leaders, to networks of 
responsibility. Responsible leaders, groups of responsible individuals, and 
networks of responsible groups provide herd immunity that protects the 
whole. It’s simple, but it requires smart, caring, humble, and strong leaders 
throughout the organization. 
John P. Kotter, in his book, The Heart of Change, makes reference to 
the U.S.’s success in WWII and underscores the need for leadership 
throughout the organization.259 He writes, “[The war] . . . forced a 
bureaucratic military to miraculously produce a handful of great leaders, 
hundreds of good leaders, and tens of thousands of people who performed 
leadership acts.” 260 Where have they gone? 
 
 259. See JOHN P. KOTTER, THE HEART OF CHANGE: REAL LIFE STORIES OF HOW PEOPLE 
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 260. Id. at 185. 
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Few would argue that Lee Iacocca, former chairman of Chrysler 
Corporation, did not demonstrate exceptional leadership qualities during his 
very successful career. In his book, Where have all the Leaders Gone?, he 
concludes that great leaders operate from the nine “C”s: 
Curiosity — a leader is a reader and listener. 
Creative — a leader thinks outside the box. 
Communicate — a leader tells the truth, even when it is painful. 
Character — a leader knows the difference between right and wrong 
and [has] the guts to do the right thing. 
Courage — a leader has ‘the balls’ and is committed to talk and 
negotiate. 
Conviction — a leader has fire in the belly passion. 
Charisma — a leader has the ability to inspire and people follow a 
leader because they trust him. 
Competent — a leader knows what he is doing, but more importantly 
surrounds himself with others who know what they are doing. 
Common Sense — a leader is a human, so has the ‘ability to reason 
and use common sense and does it.’261 
Stephen M.R. Covey expands on the enormous potential influence of 
leadership in The Speed of Trust, saying that high-trust organizations are 
characterized by increased value, accelerated growth, enhanced innovation, 
improved collaboration, stronger partnering, better execution, and 
heightened loyalty while low-trust organizations show redundancy, 
bureaucracy, politics, disengagement, turnover, churn, and fraud.262 Where 
would you rather work and from which would you expect safety and security 
lapses? 
Leaders come in all types and there is no single style or mold. Many 
have been uncharacteristically strong leaders and have inspired trust in their 
people and organizations. Others have been kind leaders and they too 
inspire trust. Personality type is less important than the fundamentals of 
character and integrity. William F. Baker, Ph.D., and Michael O’Malley, 
Ph.D., in their book, Leading with Kindness, equate kindness with a 
commitment to the welfare of your company.263 Kindness, they state, is 
compassion rather than being distant, integrity is to think, say and act from 
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the same set of values, gratitude is, therefore, considering employees as 
people rather than assets, authenticity rather than fraudulence, humility is to 
listen and learn from others, and, finally, humor.264 
A powerful set of leadership principles comes from Robert J. Shoop’s, 
Ph.D., book, entitled A University Renaissance.265 Dr. Shoop describes the 
visionary leadership early in Jon Wefald’s, Ph.D., presidency at Kansas State 
University and the principles on which it was based as listed below: 
1) Have a Vision and Develop a Game Plan 
A leader must be able to provide a clear vision of a transformed future. 
Vision encompasses strategy and goal setting but is more than simply having 
a plan. Vision is a passionate commitment to creatively closing the gap 
between the present reality and the desired future. 
2) Communicate Your Vision 
A vision is useless unless it can be shared with others. A leader must possess 
a wide-range of communication skills –– articulating issues, listening to what 
others have to say, and understanding diverse perspectives. 
3) Hire Excellent People and Delegate Authority and Responsibility 
Leaders develop the networks, relationships, and culture that form a 
community. In healthy communities, everyone can find meaning and 
motivation. A team attitude exists and individuals are eager to cooperate for 
the common good. Collaboration makes a community greater than the sum 
of its parts and enables a vision to be realized. 
4) Make Decisions and Take Risks 
True leaders have the courage to act. They take risks and make tough 
decisions. Without risk, there is no progress. Leaders must be willing to 
make bold moves and embrace the seemingly impossible. 
5) Admit Mistakes and Apologize When Necessary 
A leader who encourages risk-taking must allow mistakes to be made. A 
leader should quickly recognize mistakes, apologize, and remedy the 
situation. Accountable leaders learn from their mistakes and make changes. 
Being accountable means being in charge of your choices. 
6) Be Trustworthy and Care About Others 
Visions are based on values. For good leaders, the means are just as 
important as the end. They make improvements with integrity, taking the 
 
 264. Id. at 41-71. 
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right actions for the right reasons. They know that trust and credibility are 
central to the leadership process. 
7) Never Give Up 
Never give up. Work hard. Those simple statements are at the heart of 
successful leadership. The best leaders love what they are doing and put 
everything they have into their efforts. Leaders make commitments and have 
the determination to see them through. 
8) Have a Sense of Humor 
Good leaders are not afraid to laugh with others and at themselves. They 
maintain a healthy sense of balance and perspective and know that humor 
can sometimes diffuse a tense situation.266 
Humility is not the first word that comes to mind when the average 
person thinks about leadership; it is probably power, authority, or even 
arrogance. But humility is absolutely essential to great leadership and what 
is sometimes perceived as arrogance is often simply confidence. Humility 
facilitates another characteristic of a great leader –– appreciating employees 
who are smarter than you. Bo Peabody, in his book, Lucky or Smart? Secrets 
to an Entrepreneurial Life, tells would-be entrepreneurs to create an 
environment where smart people gather and then be smart enough to stay 
out of the way.267 He goes on to say that managers are A-students and 
entrepreneurs are B-students.268 Likewise, it is not unusual to find that the 
best leaders are very comfortable when surrounded by people who are 
smarter than they. 
In industry and even in academia today, the great leaders rise to the top 
on merit. As the moral underpinnings of the electorate weaken, elected 
officials in a democracy can become more interested in their own position 
of authority than the good of their electorate or even their nation. When they 
do, their inclination is to try to control when the issues are too complex for 
them to resolve quickly and easily. As in the case with DURC and the insider 
threat, they often choose to regulate and in doing so, upset the balance 
between appropriate regulation and freedom. An over-regulated individual, 
organization, or nation will not attain its full potential. 
XII.  CONCLUSION 
A. Our Place in the World 
Exceptional leaders and thinkers drafted the intellectual and legal 
foundation of the U.S. We were made a free and powerful nation by great 
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leaders. Leaders in our most productive laboratories demonstrate personal 
responsibility and inculcate corporate responsibility. With the global 
proliferation of biological technologies and knowledge, we now face well-
qualified and serious competition in the life sciences. Patrick Lencioni, in his 
book, Healthy Organizations, states “because of this global competition, it 
will become ever more difficult to have a competitive advantage based on 
knowledge and technologies,”269 but a healthy organization can compete 
on this new, more level playing field. DURC issues and insider threat are 
rare, but potentially harmful outcomes of the life sciences enterprise. Both 
are outlier risks that are more likely to occur in an unhealthy or poorly led 
organization. 
Personal and corporate responsibility provide herd immunity, which can 
protect, rehabilitate, or ferret out the outliers in an organization. 
Communities of trust characterize the kind of corporate responsibility 
typically orchestrated by enlightened leadership. Every organization needs 
regulation; we must know the boundaries of the playing field and the rules 
of the game. The greater the potential for injury in the game, the thicker the 
rulebook. The safety rulebook in a high-containment infectious disease 
laboratory is thick and applies to everyone. The DURC and the insider threat 
rulebooks are there for the outliers, but they impact all of us. When rules for 
the few become too disruptive to the work of the many, communities of trust 
can break down. Laboratories with exceptional leaders armed with well 
thought-out and thin DURC and insider threat rulebooks will always be 
safer, more secure, and far more productive than laboratories where the 
many are overregulated because of the few. It takes courage to do the right 
thing –– to mentor, grow leaders, and then give them the responsibility, 
authority, and the freedom to succeed. Will we find leaders with the wisdom 
and the moral courage to rebalance our approach to DURC and the insider 
threat? 
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